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FOREWORD
STRUCTURING SENTENCING
DISCRETION: THE NEW FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES
ILENE H. NAGEL*
PREFACE
On October 12, 1984, the most broad reaching reform of fed-
eral sentencing in this century became law with the passage of the
Sentencing Reform Act.' The purpose of the Act was to attack the
tripartite problems of disparity, dishonesty, and for some offenses,
excessive leniency, all seemingly made worse by a system of near
unfettered judicial discretion.2
For decades, empirical studies repeatedly showed that similarly
situated offenders were sentenced, and did actually serve, widely
disparate sentences.3 Furthermore, the disparity found to charac-
terize federal sentencing was thought to sometimes mask, and be
* Commissioner, United States Sentencing Commission; Professor of Law, Indiana
University School of Law (Bloomington). M.L.S., Stanford University School of Law;
Ph.D., New York University. Special thanks for editorial suggestions and comments are
extended to: Brian Bertonneau, Richard Fraher, Nicolas Mansfield, S. Jay Plager, Ste-
phen Saltzburg, Stephen Schulhofer, Sylvia Voreas, and Ronald Weich. The views ex-
pressed herein are those of the Author alone and are not meant to represent the views of
the United States Sentencing Commission.
I Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codi-
fied in 18 U.S.C. ch. 227, 229, 232; 28 U.S.C. ch. 58).
2 See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 38-39 (1983).
3 See Sentencing Guidelines: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the House
Committee on theJudiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 661-731 (1987) [hereinafter Sentencing
Guidelines Hearings] (testimony of Commissioner Nagel); S. REP. No. 225, supra note 2, at
41-50; M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973); Clancy,
Bartolomeo, Richardson & Wellford, Sentence Decisionmaking: The Logic of Sentence Decisions
and the Extent and Sources of Sentence Disparity, 72J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 524 (1981);
Seymour, 1972 Sentencing Study for the Southern District of New York, 45 N.Y. ST. B.J. 163
(1973); Address by Commissioner Ilene H. Nagel, The Federalist Society Second An-
nual Lawyers Convention, Washington, D.C., (Sept. 10, 1988) (This speech is to be pub-
lished in 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. (Spring 1989)).
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correlated with, discrimination on the basis of a defendant's race,
sex, or social class. For a system claiming equal justice for all, dis-
parity was an inexplicable yet constant source of embarrassment.
The charge of dishonesty stemmed from the fact that sentences
pronounced by the court were, with rare exception, never served:
twelve years meant four, eighteen meant six, thirty meant ten.4 The
court and defendants were privy to the numerical symbolism; only
the public and the victim were duped by the sham. Moreover, while
the parole system purported to reduce disparity, it failed because it
never addressed the disparity within the first decision-whether an
offender was or was not imprisoned. Furthermore, it served to per-
petuate a system where the judge's sanction was not dispositive.5
Finally, year after year, public opinion polls confirmed the hia-
tus between sentences meted out by the court and the public's nor-
mativejudgment of what should be appropriate sentences for given
offense/offender patterns. 6 On the whole, sentences served were
considerably and consistently more lenient than public estimates of
what ought to be the normative societal response.
In October, 1985, President Reagan appointed, and the United
States Senate confirmed, 7 seven persons to serve staggered," full
time terms as the first members of the United States Sentencing
Commission. The primary task set for the Commission was to pro-
mulgate mandatory sentencing guidelines to structure the discretion
of federal judges so as to attack the problems delimited above, and
to provide a morejust and effective sentencing system.9 In this Arti-
cle, the way in which that discretion was structured in the first itera-
4 See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 4163, 4164, 4205 (repealed 1984) (good conduct credits
and parole eligibility after serving one-third of the court-imposed sentence). See 18
U.S.C. § 4163 (repealed 1984) (prisoner discharged at expiration of term of sentence
less good conduct credits); 18 U.S.C. § 4164 (repealed 1984) ( prisoner released on
good conduct considered on parole until expiration of sentence term); 18 U.S.C. § 4205
(repealed 1984) (eligible for parole after serving one-third of court-imposed sentence).
5 See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 2, at 46-50; Kennedy, Towarda New System of Criminal
Sentencing: Law With Order, 16 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 353, 360-62 (1979).
6 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE STATISTICS-1987 142-43 (K.Jamieson & T. Flanagan
eds. 1988).
7 The original seven members of the Sentencing Commission were nominated on
September 12, 1985 (131 CONG. REC. S 11,401 (1985)) and were confirmed on October
16, 1985 (131 CONG. REC. S133,376 (1985)).
8 See 28 U.S.C. § 992 (1984). Commissioners Breyer and Robinson were appointed
to two-year terms, Commissioners Block, Corrothers, and MacKinnon were appointed
to four-year terms, and Commissioners Nagel and Wilkins were appointed to six-year
terms. 131 CONG. REC. S133,376-77 (1985).
9 See 28 U.S.C. § 994.
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tion of federal sentencing guidelines is put in historical context, and
explained against the backdrop of key decisions and policy choices.
As a sweeping and dramatic reform, it was expected that the
federal sentencing guidelines would be controversial and as such, be
subject to considerable resistance. 10 Despite the fact that they be-
came law in November, 1987, it was not actually until January, 1989,
that the Supreme Court upheld the guidelines,1' thereby removing
the major constitutional impediment to their full implementation.
Now that they are nationally in effect, it is timely to elaborate on the
structure upon which they are .founded, and the history of attempts
that came before them to structure and unstructure judicial
discretion.
Part I provides a brief introduction, defining discretion and un-
derscoring the terms of the recent call for reform. Part II is a review
of the historical shifts in sentencing goals and the concomitant shifts
in the degree of discretion allocated to the court in determining and
meting out penal sanctions. Part III presents an overview of the en-
abling legislation, The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, including
the key specific directives given to the Commission to carry out its
mandate. Part IV provides a brief discussion of Mistretta v. United
States-the constitutional challenge to the Commission and its
guidelines. Part V presents an elaboration of the bases for the major
decisions reflected in the first iteration of guidelines. Part VI
presents concluding comments and explicates the commitment to
future monitoring, evaluation, and revision. 12
I. INTRODUCTION
Discretion in its most simple terms is defined as the power of
free decision or latitude of choice within certain legal bounds13
The need for discretion in sentencing purportedly developed from
the application of the "traditional twin goals of the correctional pro-
10 In October, 1987, Congressman Conyers introduced a bill to delay the implemen-
tation of the guidelines. H.R. 3307, 100th Cong., Ist Sess., 133 CONG. REC. H8107
(1987). The bill did not pass the House. Many federal judges registered opposition to
the implementation of the guidelines. See MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 13, 1987, at IB; K. Mur-
phy, U.S. Sentencing Rules to Stress Punishment, Los ANGELES TIMES, Nov. 1, 1987, part I, at
1, col. 4 (final Sunday ed.).
11 Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989).
12 Congress provided that the Commission members would serve on a full time basis
for the first six years after the implementation of the initial guidelines in order to moni-
tor the guidelines' effectiveness and make appropriate adjustments and revisions. S.
REP. No. 225, supra note 2, at 63-64.
13 WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 362 (9th ed. 1983) [hereinafter
WEBSTER'S].
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cess-to protect society from the convicted offenders who pose a
danger to it, and to return the offender to the community as a law
abiding citizen."' 14 To achieve these goals, proponents of unfet-
tered judicial discretion have long argued that it is necessary to eval-
uate the individual needs and different risks posed by each
offender. 15 In the recent past, the widespread use of near un-
bounded discretion has been a hallmark of the American criminal
justice system. Police have been free to choose which laws receive
priority in enforcement, 16 prosecutors have chosen whether and
which charges to file, ' 7 judges have decided which sentence to mete
out,18 and parole officers have decided when a prisoner may be
released.' 9
Beginning in the 1960s, a mounting wave of criticism was di-
rected at the uses and abuses of unfettered judicial discretion. 20
14 F. MILLER, R. DAWSON, G. Dix & R. PARNAS, SENTENCING AND THE CORRECTIONAL
PROCESS 2 (1976) [hereinafter F. MILLER].
15 Judge Robert Sweet has stated, for example:
[T]here are different results from different judges meting out punishment for differ-
ent defendants for the same type of crime. The vast majority of these sentences lie
within acceptable range, and many of the differences result from the peculiarities,
the particularities of the crime, the characteristics of the defendant, and the particu-
lar interest of society as it is exemplified in the training and experience of the sen-
tencing judge....
Sentencing Guidelines: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the House Committee
on theJudiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 233, 234 (1987) (testimony of Hon. Robert Sweet,
Judge, U.S. District Court, New York, N.Y.). Further, Professor Daniel Freed has stated:
Experience in common law sentencing teaches judges that some offenders are more
culpable than others. Although lawfully convicted of the same crime, two offenders
may differ considerably in their moral blameworthiness, in the motives that led
them to crime, in their intent to injure or to protect a victim from harm, in the
sophistication or naivete with which they embarked on the enterprise, or in the gen-
uine contrition or blatant arrogance with which they viewed their crimes in retro-
spect. The objective quantity of harm done is only one element in the punishment
equation.
Judges make careful assessments of the past character and future prospects of
an offender before determining the appropriate purpose to be served by the sen-
tence, the sanction to be selected, and the severity with which it should be carried out.
Address by Professor Daniel Freed, Yale Law School, at the American Bar Association
(Aug. 11, 1987).
16 SeeJ. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR: THE MANAGEMENT OF LAW AND OR-
DER IN EIGHT COMMUNITIES 8-9 (1968); Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Crimi-
nal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration ofJustice, 69 YALE LJ. 543 (1960);
Allen, Discretion in Law Enforcement, 47 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1984, at 1.
17 See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985); LaFave, The Prosecutor's Discretion
in the United States, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 532 (1970).
18 See United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S.
241 (1949).
19 See Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 439 U.S. 817
(1979).
20 See, e.g., F. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1964); M. FRANKEL,
supra note 3;J. MITFORD, KIND AND USUAL PUNISHMENT (1973); Cohen, Sentencing, Proba-
tion and the Rehabilitative Ideal. The View fom M'iempa v. Rhay, 47 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1968).
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Consistent with this theme, a movement to reform the federal sen-
tencing process was begun, culminating in the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984 and the establishment of the United States Sentencing
Commission. 21 Under the first set of sentencing guidelines promul-
gated by the Commission, judicial discretion has not entirely been
eliminated. Rather, consistent with the statutory mandate, and the
view of experts, 22 it has been highly structured and defined. This
Article traces this restructuring process by first explaining why it
was necessary, and second, how it was accomplished, focusing in
particular on some of the key policy choices reflected in the initial
set of guidelines ultimately promulgated.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. FROM MOSES TO BECCARIA
Generally, four purposes of sentencing have found widespread
acceptance: punishment, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilita-
tion. 23 Throughout history, societies have assigned differing priori-
ties to these four goals in accordance with the prevailing
philosophies and beliefs of their day. In addition, the means em-
ployed to implement these purposes have varied widely, from death
to the mere imposition of monetary fines. In large measure, the de-
gree ofjudicial discretion in sentencing has depended on which goal
was dominant, and which methods were thought most consistent
with the stated goal(s).
Under Mosaic law, for example, the primary focus was on re-
tributive punishment. The criminal justice system was founded on
canon law, a system embodying a strict code of behavior. In this
setting, judicial discretion at sentencing was severely limited: the of-
21 The Sentencing Reform Act was passed as Chapter II of the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act (Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984)), and is published at 18
U.S.C. §§ 3551-3673 (1987) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1987).
22 The discretion of the sentencer is not the only discretion with which the de-
signer of a criminal statute should be concerned. The structure of his legislation
must also be related to the scope of the prosecutor's discretion, the allocation of
cases between different modes of trial, and the extent to which the tribunal deter-
mining guilt or innocence should be allowed a quasi-legislative discretion. His ob-
ject should be not the elimination of discretion, but the management of discretion.
He should define and distinguish between offenses in such a way as to avoid confer-
ring an excessive degree of discretion on any particular organ of criminal justice,
and to ensure that the determination of particular issues is allocated to the most
appropriate segment of the process.
D.A. Thomas, Form and Function in Criminal Law, in RESHAPING THE CRIMINAL LAW 29
(Glazebook ed. 1978).
23 See, e.g., McKay, It's Time to Rehabilitate the Sentencing Process, 60 JUDICATURE 223,
225-26 (1976).
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fense, as well as its punishment, was set in stone.24
In contrast, Roman criminal law focused primarily on deter-
rence, with punishments being executed before large groups of peo-
ple.25 Public decapitations, burnings, and crucifixions-the most
common forms of the death penalty-were liberally applied.26
Under the Roman system, judicial discretion in sentencing took a
forked path, the amount of discretion dependent largely upon when
the crime was initially recognized. Crimina publica were crimes intro-
duced by republican legislation; for these, the punishment was
clearly prescribed. Crimina extraordinaria consisted of offenses which
had been in existence under the older empire; for these, punish-
ments were left to the discretion of the judge.2 7
Medieval Europe was a somewhat confusing period in terms of
criminal law and procedure. Early canon law was based almost en-
tirely on Roman law models. The principle modifications came in
the justifications given for the harsh penalties meted out.2 8 For ex-
ample, while church leaders observed that impunity led to delin-
quency (a social concept), they also felt that inflicting penal
sanctions created a terror which restrained others from sinning.2 9
Many viewed the corporal sentences of flogging, torture, and muti-
lation as a surrogate for hell.3 0 In some cases, Roman rules of crimi-
nal procedure were strictly followed; this served to limit judicial
discretion. In other cases, however, there was little direction or su-
pervision of church officials, leaving them free to act as accuser,
judge, and executioner without review.
During the 1200s, a limited change in the perception of crime
seemed to emerge, where crime shifted from being primarily a pri-
vate concern of the church, to both a private and public concern.
According to Pope Innocent III: "In the interest of public utility,
crimes ought not to remain unpunished."'3 This proposition led to
24 Exodus 20:1-24:1.
25 Fraher, The Theoretical Justification for the New Criminal Law of the High Middle Ages:
"Rei Publicae Interest, Ne Crimina Remaneant Impunita ", 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 577, 579
(1984). Roman magistrates were charged with "correcting the excesses" of their sub-
jects with the view that the failure to punish deviancy led to moral and behavioral deteri-
oration. Id.
26 C. SHERMAN, ROMAN LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD 2 (1937).
27 Id. at 490.
28 Fraher, supra note 25, at 592-93. Under early canon law, there was a return to the
integration of crime with sin, and a rejection of the Roman notion that crime was an
offense against the Republic.
29 Id. at 579.
30 Kittrie, The Right to Be Different (1971), in SENTENCING AND THE CORRECTIONAL PRO-
CESS 10, 14 (F. Miller 2d ed. 1976).
31 Fraher, supra note 25, at 579.
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a debate over whether Roman legal procedures should be aban-
doned, 2 and whether new and quicker methods of prosecution
should be employed. In the end, the efficiency-oriented reformists
prevailed. Roman procedure was retained for a handful of offenses
recognized by church canons as crimina, while a new, inquisitorial
procedure was instituted for all other offenses, known as maleficia.
The maleficia were created by statutes which gave judges broad dis-
cretionary power (arbitrium) to punish defendants without meeting
the strict Roman rules of proof.3 3 As these grants of discretion in-
creased, abuses multiplied: the innocent were often condemned
while the guilty were set free.3 4
After the thirteenth century, the due process rights of individu-
als were reduced sharply. Although trial by ordeal had been aban-
doned, it was replaced by torture and other ex officio inquisitorial
procedures.3 5 Justification for punishment was at times based on
social utility, while at other times it was based on religious doctrines
of sin and salvation. Punishment was sometimes specified by stat-
ute, but more often than not its depth and scope were left to the
whims of the judge. Whatever the justification given, or the proce-
dures employed, punishment was most often vindictive and brutally
harsh.3 6
The rise of centralized governments in Europe marked the in-
tervention of the sovereign into criminal matters. A conqueror used
his armies to double as police; fines were developed as a way to fill
the king's coffers. Nonetheless, corporal punishment remained the
norm, with sentences still spoken of as "God's will." 3 7 Under this
system, judicial discretion varied greatly: some crimes mandated
death by order of the sovereign, while others allowed the judge to
choose both the type and severity of the sentence. Punishments
continued to be barbarous and inherently arbitrary by virtue of their
vastly unequal application.38 The fact that nobility and clergy were
32 For example, the Roman standard of proof required that the evidence to convict
an accused had to be "as clear as the light of day." Fraher, Conviction According to Con-
science: The Medievaljurist's Debate ConcerningJudicial Discretion and the Law of Proof, 7 LAw &
HisT. REV. 23, 24 (1989). Only two forms of evidence met this standard: uncontra-
dicted testimony from two eyewitnesses, or a confession by the defendant. Id.
33 Id. at 28.
34 Id. at 60.
35 Id. at 25.
36 Fraher, supra note 25, at 587-88.
37 Fraher, supra note 32.
38 The concept of incarceration as an alternative to physical sanction was slow to
develop. The earliest known jail was established in Italy in 1553. The church was again
at the center of this development. Prisons arose from the monastic concepts of solitude
and penitence. The American colonies built two early prisons in 1681 and 1682, but the
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often exempt from the court's wrath only further contributed to the
inequities of the extant system.
In the eighteenth century, the Enlightenment and Age of Rea-
son gave rise to the promulgation of new theories regarding man
and society. Crime came to be viewed as an offense against one's
fellow citizens, rather than as an affront to the state, the church, or
God. The pioneering work of Caesar Beccaria, On Crimes and Punish-
ments,39 laid a foundation for some of the more modern concepts of
today's system of criminal justice.
For Beccaria, the central theme was that "[t]he purpose of pun-
ishment... then is nothing other than to dissuade criminals from
doing fresh harm to his compatriots and to keep other people from
doing the same." 40 Beccaria advocated the adoption of five princi-
ples, consistent with his thesis. First, criminal laws should be codi-
fied and defined by theories of social contract, not by vague moral
standards. 41 Second, both the codification and interpretation of the
codes should lie with the legislature, not the judiciary.42 Third,
sentences imposed should be proportional to the crime committed,
with the focus being on the act itself rather than on the offender's
status.43 Fourth, rules of procedure should be applied to all trials,
British rulers forced their closure. As Europe struggled to end the feudal system and
cities started to grow, there was a great deal of confusion and little tolerance for experi-
ments in crime control. In 1780, Great Britain still listed 350 capital crimes on its books.
Id. at 17; see also M. IGNATIEFF, A JUST MEASURE OF PAIN: THE PENITENTIARY IN THE IN-
DUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 1750-1850 (1978).
39 C. BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (D. Young trans. 1986).
40 Id. at 23.
41 Id. at 7-9, 72-73.
42 Id. at 10-12. One passage is of particular application to the question of judicial
discretion:
Nothing is more dangerous than the common axiom that one must consult the
spirit of the law. This is a dike that is readily breached by the torrent of opinion
.... Everyone has his own point oi view, and everyone has a different one at differ-
ent times. The spirit of the law, then, would be dependent on the good and bad
logic of a judge, on a sound or unhealthy digestion, on the violence of his passions,
on the infirmities he suffers, on his relations with the victim, and on all the slight
forces that change the appearance of every object in the fickle human mind. Thus
we see the fate of a citizen change several times in going from one court to another,
and we see the lives of poor wretches are at the mercy of false reasonings or the
momentary churning of ajudges' humors. Thejudge deems all this confused series
of notions which affect his mind to be a legitimate interpretation. Thus we see the
same court punish the same crime in different ways at different times because it
consulted the erroneous instability of interpretations rather than the firm and con-
stant voice of the law ....
... any confusion arising from the rigorous observation of the letter of the law
cannot be compared with the disorders that spring from interpretation.
Id. at 11.
43 Id. at 14-16.
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and a presumption of innocence should be used.44 Fifth, corporal
punishment should be replaced by imprisonment, and the death
penalty should be banned.45
Beccaria's ideas were not well received by the established rulers
of his day. The Roman Catholic Church denounced him as a heretic
and a socialist, placing his book on an index of condemned works. 46
Notwithstanding this public demonstration of rejection, his ideas
eventually took root, being explored and refined by the likes ofJohn
Howard and Jeremy Bentham. The very distinguished Samuel
Romilly, in particular, later embraced Beccaria's concerns for the
dangers of allowing judges too much discretion in interpreting and
applying laws. 47 For Sir Romilly, it was the arbitrary decisions made
possible by unfettered discretion that gave rise to the pejorative yet
oft-heard characterization of justice as no more than a lottery.
Collectively, these eighteenth and ninteenth century philoso-
phers and writers laid the theoretical groundwork for what is today
known as "classical criminology." This school of thought stresses
deterrence as its primary goal, emphasizing equality and certainty of
punishment as the means to achieving this end.48 Consistent with
this theoretical paradigm, punishments were prescribed for crimes
according to their perceived seriousness; in England this became
known as the "tariff." 49 Tariffs and similar sentencing structures
were set by the legislature rather than by the sovereign or the
church. Consequently, judicial discretion was once again reduced.
With the enactment of the 1791 Penal Code, France became the first
country to formally adopt this system. Other civil and common law
44 Id. at 24-25, 56-60.
45 Id. at 48-55.
46 Despite his controversial place in history, many of Beccaria's ideals found ultimate
expression in the United States Constitution and helped to establish the fundamental
premises upon which the early criminal justice system in America was founded. Bec-
caria, for example, advocated such ideas as the right to a speedy trial, id. at 36, the right
to confront one's accusers, id. at 27, equal justice under law, id. at 38-39, and the pre-
sumption of innocence, id. at 24-25.
47 Romilly noted in 1810:
[T]he very same circumstance which is considered by one judge as a matter of
extenuation, is deemed by another a high aggravation of the crime .... [I]f every
judge be left to follow the light of his own understanding and to act upon the princi-
ples and the system which he has derived partly from his own observations, and his
reading, and partly from his natural temper and his early impressions, the law inva-
riable only in theory, must in practice be continually shifting with the temper, and
habits, and opinions of those by whom it is administered.
S. ROMILLY, OBSERVATIONS ON THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND (1810).
48 Tappan, Sentencing Under the Model Penal Code, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 528, 529
(1958).
49 D. THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF SENTENCING: THE SENTENCING POLICY OF THE COURT
OF APPEAL CRIMINAL DIVISION 5 (2d ed. 1979).
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countries soon followed suit.50
B. THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
Early American colonists seem not to have strayed too far from
the criminal justice systems they left behind.5t Capital and corporal
punishment remained the norm, with fines being levied for eco-
nomic crimes. Defendants who could not pay were whipped, placed
in stocks, or branded. In general, punishments were legislatively
prescribed. Many of the criminal codes were, however, incomplete;
in these instances, judges were provided little direction as to the
choice of punishment. Jails were still a novel concept, used primar-
ily to hold those awaiting trial.52
After the War of Independence, most states revised their crimi-
nal codes. The use of the death penalty and other forms of corporal
punishment waned. In their place, states began to turn to imprison-
ment-not as a form of punishment, but as a means of reforming
the prisoner-a concept not used since the monastic experiments. 53
It was believed that through a regimented system of discipline, la-
bor, and religious exhortation, the prisoner could be "cured" of his
or her evil ways. 54
Throughout this period, and up through 1870, legislators re-
tained most of the discretionary power over criminal sentencing.
Each crime had a defined punishment; the period of incarceration
was generally prescribed with specificity by the legislature.55 Judges
were given some sentencing discretion, but only within ranges that
were narrow compared to later developments. 56  Moreover,
sentences were fairly rigid, not generally subject to reductions once
incarceration began.
In the early 1800s, several jurisdictions began to temper their
50 Tappan, supra note 48, at 529.
51 See S. SHANE-DuBow, A. BROWN & E. OLSEN, SENTENCING REFORM IN THE UNITED
STATES: HISTORY, CONTENT AND EFFECT 2 (1985); Dershowitz, Criminal Sentencing in the
United States: An Historical and Conceptual Overview, 423 ANNALS 117, 124-25 (1976).
52 Dershowitz, supra note 51, at 124-25.
53 See Kittrie, supra note 30, at 17, and accompanying text.
54 See D. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN
THE NEW REPUBLIC (1971). An early proponent of this rehabilitative theory was Dr. Ben-
jamin Rush, who with the Philadelphia Society for Alleviating the Miseries of Public Pris-
ons, helped to establish the Walnut StreetJail. Thisjail was an early proving ground for
the new theory of individualized reformative incarceration. Id. at 61-62.
55 REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING,
FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT 83-85 (1976) [hereinafter FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT
REPORT].
56 Dershowitz, supra note 51, at 126; see United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 45-48
(1978).
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sentencing structures. New statutes allowed judges to consider ag-
gravating and mitigating circumstances which further characterized
the context of the offense, and then select a term of years from a
sentence range defined by the legislature. 57 Thus, while Congress
clearly retained the power to fix the sentence for federal crimes,58
and Congress controlled the scope ofjudicial discretion, 59 the rigid-
ity characteristic of the original fixed statutory penalty structure was
abandoned in favor of increased judicial discretion. 60
Until 1870, the primary purposes of incarceration in the United
States were retribution and punishment. 6' In 1870, however, the
rehabilitative theory of prisons and punishment was brought to the
forefront of the nation's attention by the National Congress of Pris-
ons. The Congress voted for a Declaration of Principles wherein it
stated the following:
[Crime is] a moral disease, of which punishment is the remedy. The
efficiency of the remedy is a question of social therapeutics, a question
of the fitness and the measure of the dose .... [P]unishment is di-
rected not to the crime but to the criminal .... The supreme aim of
prison discipline is the reformation of criminals and not the infliction
of vindictive suffering.62
Concomitant with the theories of prison as a rehabilitative insti-
tution, and justice as aimed at individual restoration, was the devel-
opment of the then innovative indeterminate sentence. So long as
reformation was the principal goal of imprisonment, it was reasoned
57 Tappan, supra note 48, at 529.
58 See United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76 (1820).
59 Exparte United States, 242 U.S. 27 (1916).
60 Brief for the United States Sentencing Commission as Amicus Curiae at 4-5,
United States v. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989) (No. 87-7028).
61 United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 46 (1978).
62 AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION, TRANSACTIONS OF THE NATIONAL CON-
GRESS OF PRISONS AND REFORMATORY DISCIPLINE (1870). This theory of reform later took
on the title of "positivist criminology." It was popular to speak of crime in medical
terms-crime was no more or less than a treatable disease, as the 1931 Wickersham
Commission explained:
Physicians, upon discovering disease, cannot name the day upon which the patient
will be healed. No more can judges intelligently set the day of release from prison
at the time of trial....
... Boards of parole [on the other hand] can study the prisoner during his
confinement .... Within their discretion they can grant a comparatively early re-
lease to youths, to first offenders, to particularly worthy cases who give high prom-
ise of leading a new life.... [And they can] keep vicious criminals in confinement as
long as the law allows.
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT (WICKERSHAM COMMIS-
SION), REPORT ON PENAL INSTITUTIONS, PROBATION AND PAROLE 142-43 (1931).
Others saw the rehabilitative model as a vehicle by which the state acted out a pa-
rental role ("parens patriae"): society sought not to punish, but to change the offender
through treatment and therapy. See, e.g., Kittrie, supra note 30.
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that the prisoner should be sentenced until he or she had re-
formed-which was by definition an indeterminate time. 63 It was
not long before these creative ideas reached the ears of state legisla-
tors. Attracted by both the putative practical and humanitarian po-
tential, states seized upon this new construct as a progressive
response to the growing problem of crime. Between 1880 and
1899, seven states passed indeterminate sentencing laws. From
1900 to 1911, another twenty-one states formally joined the ranks.64
By the 1960s, every state in the nation had an indeterminate sen-
tencing system of one form or another.65
This "enlightened" reform movement brought with it an im-
portant change in the relationship between the legislature and the
judiciary. The legislature now made a conscious choice to delegate
more of the responsibility of sentencing to the judiciary and the cor-
rections departments; according to the evidence, it delegated with a
vengeance. 66 Such a posture seemed justified, since indeterminate
sentencing was founded upon the theory of rehabilitation, and it
could only be applied with the liberal use of discretion. Judges, pro-
bation officers, and parole officials found themselves in new and un-
familiar territory. In looking back years later, Judge Marvin Frankel
would describe those operating in this new mode of decision making
as "[l]eft at large, wandering in deserts of uncharted discretion." 67
The indeterminate sentencing system grew steadily in scope
and support. 68 Those who ventured forth with criticisms were
thought to be procrustean, backwards, or atavistic. In 1910, follow-
ing the lead of some of the early states, Congress officially entered
the realm of indeterminate sentencing. The congressional scheme
involved a sharing of sentencing power between all three branches
of government: Congress set the maximum penalty, the judge im-
posed a sentence from the appropriate range, and parole officials
63 Thus the Prison Congress wrote, "Peremptory sentences ought to be replaced by
those of indeterminate duration-sentences limited only by satisfactory proof of refor-
mation should be substituted for those measured by mere lapse of time." AMERICAN
CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 62.
64 Zalman, The Rise and Fall of the Indeterminate Sentence, 24 WAYNE L. REv. 45, 52
(1977).
65 S. SHANE-DuBow, A. BROWN & E. OLSON, supra note 51, at 6.
66 For example, the California Adult Authority was empowered to commit a criminal
for a period of one year to life for many offenses. The judges' sole duty was to decide if
this "sentence" was to be imposed in lieu of probation or a fine. See also Sentencing
Provisions of the Model Penal Code (Proposed Official Draft 1966), reprinted in L. OR-
LAND, JUSTICE, PUNISHMENT, TREATMENT: THE CORRECTIONAL PROCESS 9-19 (1973).
67 M. FRANKEL, supra note 3, at 7-8.
68 Dershowitz, supra note 51, at 126-28.
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determined the actual length of imprisonment.69 In 1949, the
United States Supreme Court put its imprimatur of approval on re-
habilitative imprisonment.70 Indeterminate sentencing and rehabili-
tative goals continued to enjoy immense popularity and support up
through the 1960s. 7 1
C. THE FALL OF INDETERMINATE SENTENCING
In 1975, Alan Dershowitz wrote:
[I]t seems that the day of the indeterminate sentence is passing-and
with few regrets. While law-and-order conservatives remain per-
suaded that indeterminate sentencing is just one more form of cod-
dling criminals, prisoners and their defenders outside the walls are
complaining that it has resulted in too much power for parole boards
and longer stays in prison. Prison officials blame the system for over-
crowding .... In short, a surprising consensus is emerging around the
idea that it is time to return to uniformity in sentencing.72
The fall of the indeterminate sentencing movement proved to be
almost as swift as its meteoric rise. This time, however, empirical
research rather than theory lay at the core of the change.
As early as 1933, studies of the exercise ofjudicial discretion in
sentencing revealed striking differences and wide disparity in sen-
tence type and length. 73 Furthermore, the offender's race, sex, reli-
gion, income, education, occupation and other status characteristics
were found to influence judicial outcomes. 74 Discretion seemed in-
extricably linked with discrimination.
By the 1970s, public interest in the criminal justice system
prompted what Professor Leslie Wilkins termed a "crime research
69 See United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 188-89 (1979); Williams v. New
York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949) (execution of parole system depends upon parole com-
mission's discretion).
70 In Williams, 337 U.S. at 247-48 (footnotes omitted), the Court wrote:
A sentencing judge... is not confined to the narrow issue of guilt. His task within
fixed statutory or constitutional limits is to determine the type and extent of punish-
ment ....
... Indeterminate sentences ... have to a large extent taken the place of old
rigidly fixed punishments.... Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of
criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become important
goals of criminal jurisprudence.
71 Dershowitz, supra note 51, at 126-28.
72 Dershowitz, Let the Punishment Fit the Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1975, Magazine
Section, at 7.
73 Gaudet, Harris & St. John, Individual Differences in the Sentencing Tendencies ofJudges,
23J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 811 (1933).
74 See id.; R. MARTIN, THE DEFENDANT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, U. OF TEXAS BULL. No.
3437 (Bureau of Research in the Social Sciences No. 9, 1934)
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boom time." 7 5 For a variety of reasons, the study of prison reforms
was defined as strategic in the field of criminological research. As a
result of increased attention and substantial methodological ad-
vances, empiricists began to uncover and publish evidence for two
recurrent themes: first, the hoped-for rehabilitation of offenders
was not occurring;7 6 second, disparity and its sometime corollary-
discrimination-were at intolerable levels. 77 At the forefront of
these charges was a leading judicial scholar, Judge Marvin Frankel.
With utmost candor, Judge Frankel pierced the veiled myth of pris-
ons as rehabilitative, and unfettered judicial discretion as right
minded, when he concluded from his experience that unlike medical
diagnoses, with criminals it is impossible to determine when, if ever,
the "patient" will be "cured." 7 8 Many echoed the systematic failure
of coercive rehabilitation. 7 9 Delivering the death knell, Professor
Robert Martinson succinctly concluded: "Rehabilitation, tested em-
pirically, is a failure; 'nothing works' as a prison reform program to
75 Wilkins, Disparity in Dispositions: The Early Ideas and Application of the Guidelines, in
SENTENCING REFORM 11 (Wasik & Pease eds. 1987).
76 See, e.g., D. LIPTON, R. MARTINSON &J. WILKES, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORREC-
TIONAL TREATMENT: A SURVEY OF TREATMENT EVALUATION STUDIES (1975); Martinson,
What Works: Questions and Answers about Prison Reform, 1974 PUB. INTEREST, Spring 1984,
at 22; Robinson & Smith, The Effectiveness of Correctional Programs, 17 CRIME & DELINQ. 67
(1971); D. Greenburg, Much Ado About Little: The Correctional Effects of Corrections (June
1974) (unpublished summary of effectiveness studies prepared for the Committee for
the Study of Incarceration).
77 See, e.g., A. PARTRIDGE & W.B. ELDRIDGE, THE SECOND CIRCUIT SENTENCING STUDY:
A REPORT TO THEJUDGES (1974); L. WILKINS, J. KRESS, D. GOTrFREDSON, J. CAIPIN & A.
GELMAN, SENTENCING GUIDELINES: STRUCTURING JUDICIAL DISCRETION, REPORT ON THE
FEASIBILITY STUDY (1978); Austin & Williams, A Survey of Judges' Responses to Simulated
Legal Cases: Research Note on Sentencing Disparity, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 306
(1977); Diamond & Zeisel, Sentencing Councils: A Study of Sentence Disparity and Its Reduction,
43 U. CHI. L. REV. 109 (1975); Hopkins, Is There a Class Bias in Criminal Sentencing?, 42
AM. Soc. REV. 176 (1977); Howard, Racial Discrimination in Sentencing, 59JUDICATURE 121
(1975); Nagel & Hagan, Gender and Crime: Offense Patterns and Criminal Court Sanctions, 4
CRIME & JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 91 (N. Morris & M. Tonry eds.
1983); Comment, Texas Sentencing Practices: A Statistical Study, 45 TEX. L. REV. 471 (1967).
78 Thus Frankel continued:
[W]e send the prisoner away for as long as the [cure] may require, not knowing
when or whether it may be achieved; and we go on to the next case borne on a
vaporous sense of virtue and justice....
... In this state of blissful ignorant cruelty, we dump into our generally huge
prisons unsorted varieties of prisoners-the few who may need treatment we know
how to supply, the many we don't know how to treat, whatever they may need ....
This is the macabre but not astonishing culmination of the indeterminate-sentenc-
ing process that rests mainly on fiction and absent-mindedness.
M. FRANKEL, supra note 3, at 92-93.
79 See D. LIPTON, R. MARTINSON & J. WILKES, supra note 76; L. ORLAND, PRISONS:
HOUSES OF DARKNESS (1975); A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISH-
MENTS (1976);J. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME (1975).
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reduce recidivism." 8 0
If there were any who clung to indeterminate sentencing for
reasons other than its alleged tie to rehabilitation, now shown to be
devoid of any empirical support, the outpouring of research on the
other theme-disparity-paved the way for the emergent commit-
ment to restructuring discretion. Justice Potter Stewart, writing as
early as 1958, noted: "It is an anomaly that a judicial system which
has developed so scrupulous a concern for the protection of a crimi-
nal defendant throughout every other stage of the proceedings
against him should have so neglected this most important dimen-
sion of fundamental justice." This dimension was "equal justice
under the law."8 1
Disparity studies multiplied; consistently, the results revealed
gross variations that could neither be explained by rational categori-
zation of criminals, nor justified by referring to treatment goals. 82
Judge Frankel lamented: "The evidence is conclusive that judges of
widely varying attitudes on sentencing, administering statutes that
confer huge measures of discretion, mete out widely divergent
sentences where the differences are explainable only by the varia-
tions among the judges, not by material differences in the defend-
ants or their crimes." 8 3 The fears of Sir Romilly expressed 162
years earlier could no longer be ignored.84 Justice as a lottery could
not be defended.
Having established the fact that the system was characterized by
disparity, three primary sources for the unwarranted sentencing dis-
parity were identified: "(1) lack of qlearly defined and accepted sen-
tencing goals, priorities, and criteria; (2) substantial discretion
exercised by sentencing judges and paroling authorities in the ab-
sence of such goals and criteria; and (3) the procedures under which
this discretion was customarily exercised." 85
With respect to sentencing goals, two major theoretical para-
80 Martinson, What Works?-Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 1974 PUB. IN-
TEREST, Spring 1984, at 22.
81 .Shepard v. United States, 257 F.2d 293, 294 (6th Cir. 1958).
82 See, e.g., AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A RE-
PORT ON CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1971); FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT
REPORT, supra note 55; Seymour, supra note 3, at 163; Clancy, Bartolomeo, Richardson &
Wellford, supra note 3, at 553-54; Cook, Sentencing Behavior of FederalJudges: Draft Cases-
1972, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 597 (1973); 1972 Sentencing Study for the Southern District of New
York, 45 N.Y. ST. BJ. 163 (1973); Nagel & Hagan, The Sentencing of White-Collar Crime in the
Federal Courts: A Socio-Legal Exploration of Disparity, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1427 (1982).
83 Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 54 (1973).
84 S. ROMILLY, supra note 47.
85 Hoffman & Stover, Reform in the Determination of Prison Terms: Equity, Determinacy and
the Parole Release Function, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 89, 96 (1978).
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digms vied now for preeminence. The first school of thought, under
the modem day rubric 'just deserts," advocates a system of sentenc-
ing that rejects the utilitarian premise that punishment can bejusti-
fied by its results. Rather, proponents of this thesis argue that those
who violate the rights of others deserve only to be punished in ac-
cordance with their individual level of blameworthiness.8 6 Many ad-
vocating this thesis or variants thereof are quick to recant, however,
from a truly retributivist based model. They fear that such a model
compromises their somewhat incompatible, yet nonetheless
strongly held views that sentencing decisions should be bounded by
a desire to reduce demands on prison capacity,8 7 and that less rather
than more punishment is needed. 8
Whereas the just deserts approach looks primarily backward to
the culpability or blameworthiness of the offense committed, the
utilitarian approach looks forward to the effect of punishment on
future conduct. The modern day proponent of the forward-looking
theme, as first advocated by Bentham, is H.L.A. Hart. Hart articu-
lated a model of punishment emphasizing the goals of deterrence,
prevention, and reform.89 Fortunately, since Hart, there has been
no paucity of well conceived approaches, each of which has further
contributed to the debate on the primacy of goals by extrapolating
the alleged best of each paradigm, while attempting to restrict the
more rigid principles.90
Just as there is now almost a plethora of pure and hybrid theo-
ries to guide the specification of goals, and the assignment of rank-
ordered priorities, recent years have been witness to the spawning
of a multitude of provocative approaches to structure judicial discre-
tion, consistent with whichever goals one chooses.9'
In 1984, after much deliberation, taking of testimony, and a
86 A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 79.
87 A. VON HIRSCH, STRUCTURING SENTENCING DISCRETION: A COMPARISON OF TECH-
NIQUES 5 (1988).
88 A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 79, at 4.
89 H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW (1968).
90 See, e.g., H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968); N. MORRIS,
THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974); Coffee, The Repressed Issues of Sentencing: Accounta-
bility, Predictability, and Equality in the Era of the Sentencing Commission, 66 GEO. L.J. 975
(1978); Dershowitz, Preventive Confinement: A Suggested Framework for Constitutional Analysis,
51 TEX. L. REV. 1277 (1973).
91 See, e.g., D. FOGEL, ".... WE ARE THE LIVING PROOF...": THE JUSTICE MODEL FOR
CORRECTIONS (1975); N. MORRIS, supra note 90; P. O'DONNELL, M. CHURGIN & D. CUR-
TIS, TOWARD AJUST AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM: AGENDA FOR LEGISLATIVE RE-
FORM (1977); E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS: CONCERNING A VERY OLD AND
PAINFUL QUESTION (1975); A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 79; J. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT
CRIME (1975); FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT REPORT, supra note 55.
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careful review of the extant legal scholarship on this issue, the 98th
Congress of the United States chose to structure judicial discretion
in federal sentencing by creating in the judicial branch an independ-
ent, bipartisan agency known as the United States Sentencing Com-
mission.92 The primary purpose of the Commission would be the
attack on the tripartite problems of disparity, dishonesty, and for
some offenses, excessive leniency. On reflection, it appears that
Congress chose to heed the calls of Judge Marvin Frankel and the
cadre of other distinguished legal scholars joining him to combat
head on the unacceptable consequences of unfettered discretion.
III. THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT OF 1984
A. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY -
In 1966, the Brown Commission drew national attention to the
need for sentencing reform.93 Hearings on the Brown Commis-
sion's Final Report began in 197 1;94 the first specific legislative pro-
posals affecting federal sentencing were introduced in 1973.95
Contemporaneous with the hearings on the Brown Commission's
Final Report, Judge Frankel delivered a series of key lectures at the
University of Cincinnati Law School. His critique of federal sen-
tencing procedures culminated in the proposal to create a national
sentencing commission, to be charged with establishing laws and
rules in sentencing.96 Judge Frankel's remarks received considera-
ble attention and study,97 prompting a group at Yale Law School to
coordinate a series of sentencing policy workshops. The substance
of these workshops was published in 1977, providing strong argu-
92 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1984).
93 The National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws (Brown.Commis-
sion) was created in 1966 upon the recommendation of President LyndonJohnson. The
12 member commission was chaired by California Governor Edmund G. Brown. The
Commission published its Final Report in 1971. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL REPORT (1971).
94 The National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws (Brown Commission): Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 129-514 (1971).
95 "The Criminal Justice Codification, Revision and Reform Act of 1973" was intro-
duced by Senators McClellan, Ervin, and Hruska. S. 1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1-4AI-
A5 (1973), reprinted in Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary
Comm., 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4247-4260 (1973). "The Criminal Code Reform Act of
1973" was introduced by Senators Hruska and McClellan on behalf of the Nixon Admin-
istration. S. 1400, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2001-2402 (1973), reprinted in Reform of the
Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 96th Cong., Ist Sess.
5004-5017 (1973).
96 Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 50-54 (1972).
97 Senator Kennedy has referred to Judge Frankel as "the father of sentencing
reform."
1990] 899
ILENE H. NAGEL
ment for a fourfold plan: the creation of a sentencing commission,
the establishment of sentencing guidelines, appellate review of
sentences, and the abolition of parole.98
In 1976, during the 94th Congress, Senator Edward Kennedy,
consistent with his long-standing interest in and commitment to a
more just and effective criminal justice system, introduced a com-
prehensive bill to establish sentencing guidelines. 99 The bill pro-
posed that federal judges should be guided by uniform goals and
purposes during the application of such guidelines. Similar and re-
lated bills with refinements and revisions were introduced in the
95th, 96th, and 97th Congresses.100 Finally, in 1983, a bipartisan
coalition of twenty-three senators introduced S. 668--The Sentenc-
ing Reform Act of 1983.101 Thirteen days after the introduction of
S. 668, the Reagan Administration tendered its own bill (S. 829),
containing substantially similar sentencing provisions 0 2 with spe-
cific modifications aimed at currying widespread congressional
support.
In its report on S. 1762,103 the SenateJudiciary Committee con-
cluded that the extant federal sentencing system was based on an
outdated and unworkable model of rehabilitation. 10 4 Furthermore,
indeterminate sentencing led to widespread sentencing disparity
which could in turn be "traced directly to the unfettered discretion
the law confers on those judges and parole authorities responsible
98 p. O'DONNELL, M. CHURGIN & D. CuRTIs, supra note 91.
99 S. 2699, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 37,563-64 (1975).
100 See, e.g., S. 2572, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 501-07, 128 CONG. REC. 11,817-24
(1982); S. 1630, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101, 127 CONG. REC. 20,925-37 (1981); S. 1722,
96th Cong., 1st sess. § 101, 125 CONG. REC. 23,537-45 (1980); S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 101, 123 CONG. REC. 13,061-69 (1977).
101 Original co-sponsors of S. 668 were Senators Thurmond, Kennedy, Biden, Laxalt,
Baucus, DeConcini, Hatch, Leahy, Metzenbaum, Simpson, Specter, Abdnor, Hawkins,
Cohen, D'Amato, Chiles, Glenn, Huddleston, Lugar, Stevens, Zorinsky, Moynihan, and
Sasser. S. 668, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2-7, 129 CONG. REC. S2090-106 (daily ed.
March 3, 1983).
102 S. 829, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. §§ 201-07, 129 CONG. REc. S3076-162 (daily ed.
March 16, 1983).
103 Entitled the "Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983," S. 1762, 98th Cong.,
Ist Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S11,712 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1983), incorporated the major
provisions of S. 668, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S2090-106 (daily ed. March
3, 1983), and S. 829, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 201-07, 129 CONG. REC. S3090-162 (daily
ed. March 16, 1983). It is reported at S. REP. No. 225, supra note 2.
104 S. REP. No. 225, supra note 2, at 38. The Committee wrote:
Recent studies suggest that this approach has failed, and most sentencing
judges as well as the Parole Commission agree that the rehabilitation model is not
an appropriate basis for sentencing decisions. We know too little about human be-
havior to be able to rehabilitate individuals on a routine basis or even to determine
accurately whether or when a particular person has been rehabilitated.
Id. at 40.
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for imposing and implementing the sentence."' 0 5 In the minds of
many, the sweeping unfettered discretion and its unfortunate conse-
quences resulted from the lack of any statutory guidelines or review
procedures to which courts and parole boards might look.
Pursuant to its exhaustive review of the literature and the avail-
able data, and after extensive hearings, the Judiciary Committee set
forth five goals for sentencing reform legislation. 10 6 First, there was
a need for a comprehensive and consistent statement of the federal
law of sentencing. Second, sentences should be fair to both the of-
fender and society. Third, there should be certainty regarding both
the sentence and the reasons for it. Fourth, there should be a full
range of sentencing options. Fifth, the sentencing process should
be geared to achieving the same goals for both the offender and
society. 10 7 There is little doubt that the goals set forth meant to
convey the congressional desire to redress the balance between
sentences responsive to offender needs, and sentences responsive to
the needs of society for protection from criminal predation.
Consistent with and responsive to the Judiciary Committee's
aforementioned goals, Title II of S. 1762108 contained the long
awaited statement of the goals of sentencing in the federal system.
These included the following:
(1) the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote
respect for the law, and to provide just punishment; (2) the need to
afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (3) the need to pro-
tect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (4) the need
to provide the defendant with educational br vocational training, med-
ical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective
manner. 109
105 Id. at 38.
106 Id. at 39.
107 Id.
108 S. 1762, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S11,712 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1983).
109 S. REP. No. 225, supra note 2, at 50. These goals are a restatement of the basic
purposes of sentencing-deterrence, incapacitation, punishment, and rehabilitation.
The Committee believed that each of the four purposes should be considered when
imposing sentence except where the offender was to be incarcerated. In such cases "the
sentencing judges should recognize that 'imprisonment is not an appropriate means of
promoting correction and rehabilitation.'" Id. at 67-78. By this, the Committee did not
intend to abandon efforts at rehabilitating prisoners; rather, it intended to make clear
that imprisonment should not be the sentence of choice if the primary purpose for the
sanction is rehabilitation of the offenders. Programs which enhanced the possibility of
rehabilitation, however, should be continued. Id. at 76. Also, rehabilitation was to be a
particularly important consideration for persons placed on probation. Id. See generally
Memorandum of September 4, 1986, from Sen. Markham to Commissioner Ronald
Gainer, The Crime Control Mandate of the U.S. Sentencing Commission (copy on file at
the Commission) [hereinafter Markham Memorandum].
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In addition to considering these goals, sentencing judges were
instructed to review the following: 1) the nature of the offense and
the history of the offender; 2) the kinds of sentences available; 3) the
guidelines to be developed by the United States Sentencing Com-
mission; and 4) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing
disparity. 110
The statement of specific goals was meant to provide a compre-
hensive statement of the federal law of sentencing. The goals of
adequately reflecting the seriousness of the offense, promoting re-
spect for law, deterrence, and incapacitation can be assumed to have
been prompted by a desire for sentencing to be responsive to soci-
ety's right to protection from criminal predation. The goals ofjust
punishment, and the provision of education, training, and treatment
can be assumed to have been prompted by a desire for fairness and
justice for the offender. The publication of and adherence to such
clear goals provided the hope for increased certainty. Finally, the
range of options would be provided through certain, mandated sen-
tencing guidelines tied to the offense and the criminal history of the
offender.
Under this sentencing scheme, of which guidelines were to be
an integral part, Congress set out to strike a balance between the
societal need for certainty, justness, and uniformity of punishment,
and fairness to the offender.I1 I The desire to strike this balance es-
tablished the need to retain some judicial discretion in sentencing.
Thus the Committee wrote:
The sentencing guidelines system will not remove all of the judge's
sentencing discretion. Instead, it will guide the judge in making his
decision on the appropriate sentence .... The purpose of the sentenc-
ing guidelines is to provide a structure for evaluating the fairness and
appropriateness of the sentence for an individual offender, not to
eliminate the thoughtful imposition of individualized sentences."f 2
In other words, the judge's discretion was to be defined and struc-
tured to meet the newly established goals of federal sentencing.
B. THE CONGRESSIONAL MANDATE
Congress directed the United States Sentencing Commission to
establish guidelines which would serve the multiple goals and pur-
poses of federal sentencing." 3 The guidelines would, in turn, aid
I o S. 1762, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 202, 129 CONG. REC. SI1,712 (daily ed. Aug. 4,
1983).
I I S. REP. No. 225, supra note 2, at 50-60.
112 Id. at 51-52.
113 See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1) (Supp. V 1983-1988) (effective Oct. 12, 1984).
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the sentencing judge in adhering to these same goals of criminal
punishment. Under this system, the judge's discretion would be
structured, 114 allowing for some flexibility in imposing individual
sentences but only to the extent that the judge's decision did not
conflict with the overriding purposes of punishment as set forth in
the enabling legislation. Congress thus set the parameters within
which the Sentencing Commission would work to promulgate spe-
cific guidelines. 15
Congress further identified the three modes of sanctions which
could be used: probation, fines, and imprisonment. 1' 6 Further-
more, fines, forfeiture, restitution, and notice to victims were pre-
scribed as possible additions to other sentences. 117 The court was
instructed to impose one of these three sentences within the ranges
set by the guidelines unless there are aggravating or mitigating cir-
cumstances of a kind or to a degree which were not adequately con-
sidered by the Commission, and which justify a non-guideline
sentence.' 18 After setting forth the general purposes of sentencing
and the types of sentences permitted, Congress vested in the Com-
mission the power to promulgate specific sentencing guidelines, 119
giving the Commission a number of specific directives. These direc-
tives set the boundaries within which the Commission was to create
the new guidelines. The boundaries, in the order in which they ap-
pear in the statute, include the following:
1) The guidelines were to determine whether, after conviction,
the court should impose a fine, a sentence of probation, or a term of
imprisonment. The amount of fine and term of probation or impris-
onment were to be established, as well as a determination of
whether multiple prison terms should run concurrently or
consecutively. 120
2) Sentencing ranges in the guidelines were to be consistent
with all of the pertinent provisions of Title 18 of the United States
114 For example, prior to the enactment of the federal sentencing guidelines, judges
could sentence a defendant convicted of bank robbery from anywhere between zero and
20 years in prison. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1984). Under the guidelines, judges must
choose a sentence for such a defendant from a range of 27 to 33 months (assuming a
first-time offender with no aggravating or mitigating factors). UNITED STATES SENTENC-
ING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL 2.24 (Nov. 1989) [hereinafter GUIDELINES].
115 See 28 U.S.C. § 994.
116 8 U.S.C. § 3551(b) (1988). Organizations were subject only to fines and proba-
tion. 8 U.S.C. § 3551(c).
117 8 U.S.C. § 3551(b).
118 8 U.S.C. § 3553(b).
119 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-993.
120 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1).
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3) A maximum term of imprisonment was not to exceed the
minimum term by more than twenty-five percent or six months,
whichever was greater. 122
4) In establishing offense categories, the Commission was to
take into account the following, but only to the extent relevant: the
grade of the offense, circumstances of aggravation or mitigation, the
nature and degree of harm caused by the offense, community views
on the gravity of the offense, public concern generated by the of-
fense, the deterrent effect of a particular sentence, and the current
incidence of the offense in the community and nation as a whole. 123
5) In establishing offender categories, the Commission was to
take into account the following, but only to the extent relevant: age,
education, vocational skills, mental or emotional state, physical de-
pendence (drugs), employment record, family ties and responsibili-
ties, community ties, role in the offense, criminal history, and
degree of dependence on criminal activity. 124
6) The guidelines were to be neutral as to the race, sex, national
origin, creed, and socioeconomic status of the offender. 125
7) The guidelines, when recommending a term of imprison-
ment, were to reflect the general inappropriateness of considering
the education, vocational skills, employment record, family ties and
responsibilities, and community ties of the individual defendant. 126
8) The guideline sentences were to be both certain and fair,
while at the same time maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit in-
dividualized sentencing when there were circumstances not prop-
erly taken into account by the guidelines. 127
9) The guidelines were to take into account the nature and ca-
pacity of penal, correctional, and other facilities and services
available. ' 28
10) The guidelines were to assure that a sentence at or near the
maximum term be authorized where the defendant is over eighteen
and has been convicted of a felony that is a crime of violence or an
enumerated drug offense, and has been previously convicted of two
or more felonies, each of which was a crime of violence or an enu-
121 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(1).
122 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2).
123 28 U.S.C. § 994(c).
124 28 U.S.C. § 994(d).
125 Id.
126 28 U.S.C. § 994(e).
127 28 U.S.C. § 994(f).
128 28 U.S.C. § 99 4 (g).
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merated drug offense.1 29
11) The guidelines were to assure a substantial term of impris-
onment where the defendant: has two or more prior felony convic-
tions for offenses committed on separate occasions; committed the
offense as part of a pattern of criminal conduct from which he de-
rived a substantial portion of his income; committed the offense as
part of a conspiracy of three or more where he was a leader; com-
mitted a crime of violence while on release pending trial, sentence,
or appeal of a felony for which he was ultimately convicted, or com-
mitted an enumerated drug felony.' 30
12) The guidelines were to reflect the general appropriateness
of avoiding a sentence of imprisonment for first time offenders, and
the general appropriateness of imposing a sentence of imprison-
ment on a person convicted of a crime of violence which resulted in
serious bodily injury.' 3 '
13) The guidelines were to reflect the inappropriateness of im-
posing imprisonment for the purpose of rehabilitation, providing
educational or vocational training, or providing medical care or
other correctional treatment. 3 2
14) The guidelines were to reflect the appropriateness of incre-
mental penalties in cases of multiple offenses committed during the
same course of conduct. They were also to reflect the inappropri-
ateness of consecutive terms for conspiracy or solicitation and the
underlying offense.133
15) The guidelines were to correct the fact that current federal
sentences often did not accurately reflect the seriousness of the
offense. 134
16) The guidelines were to reflect the general appropriateness
of imposing a lower sentence in cases where the defendant substan-
tially assisted in the investigation or prosecution of another. 135
Congress thus gave the Commission a specific mandate to de-
termine what combination of offense and offender characteristics
should result in what sentence. This determination included the de-
cision of whether to impose incarceration at all, and if so, for how
long. Elements of this task included a determination of which fac-
tors to consider and the weight to be accorded to each. Congress
129 28 U.S.C. § 994(h).
130 28 U.S.C. § 994(i).
131 28 U.S.C. § 994(j).
132 28 U.S.C. § 994(k).
133 28 U.S.C. § 994(1).
134 28 U.S.C. § 994(m).
'35 28 U.S.C. § 994(n).
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granted the Commission a specific time frame in which to promul-
gate the initial parameters of the new system, as well as a six-year
period of full time effort in which to revise, refine, and modify it.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE: Mistretta v. United States
The sentencing guidelines took effect on November 1, 1987.
Shortly thereafter, defendants from across the country began filing
constitutional challenges to the Sentencing Reform Act. By the
summer of 1988, sentencing in federal courts was in a state of chaos.
Eventually, over 200 district court judges would rule the guidelines
unconstitutional, while some 120 judges would rule the opposite.
The sentencing schemes which resulted from these myriad rulings
were limited only by the imagination of the court. 3 6 The United
States Supreme Court, in recognition of the gravity of the situation,
granted an expedited appeal in a case from the Western District
Court in Missouri. In the landmark decision of Mistretta137 the
Supreme Court resoundingly rejected each and every argument
which had been presented by the petitioner.
A. FACTS OF THE CASE
John Mistretta and a a co-defendant were indicted in federal
district court in Missouri on three counts relating to a cocaine sale
and distribution. 138 Mistretta moved to have the guidelines ruled
unconstitutional on the grounds that the Sentencing Commission
constituted both a violation of the separation of powers doctrine
and an excessive delegation of authority by Congress.' 39 The dis-
trict court rejected both arguments; Mistretta pleaded guilty to the
first count of his indictment (conspiracy and agreement to distribute
136 Some courts ruled the Sentencing Reform Act completely unconstitutional. See,
e.g., United States v. Allen, 685 F. Supp. 827 (N.D. Ala. 1988); United States v. Lopez-
Barron, 685 F. Supp. 725 (S.D. Cal. 1988); United States v. Horton, 685 F. Supp. 1479
(D. Minn. 1988). Other courts chose to retain portions of the Act (such as the abolish-
ment of parole) while severing the remainder. See, e.g., United States v. Elliot, 684 F.
Supp. 1535 (D. Colo. 1988) (affirming Congress' authority to define criminal offenses
and prescribe punishments while holding the sentencing commission and its guidelines
unconstitutional). Sentencings were often deferred for lengthy periods while the judge
wrestled over what law to apply. Several jurisdictions sentenced by "old law" but still
requested the probation officers to fill out the guideline forms to inform them what the
sentence would be under "new law." More often than not, confusion was the watchword
as the very problems that the Sentencing Reform Act sought to correct (such as uncer-
tainty and disparity) were actually made worse.
'37 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989).
138 Id. at 653.
139 Id.
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cocaine). 140 The court sentenced Mistretta under the guidelines to
eighteen months' imprisonment. 141
Mistretta filed a notice of appeal to the Eighth Circuit while
concurrently petitioning the Supreme Court for certiorari before
judgment (as did the United States). 42 The Court granted these
petitions pursuant to Rule 18, noting the "imperative public impor-
tance" of the issue and the disarray among the lower courts. 143
B. HISTORY OF SENTENCING
Writing for an eight to one majority, Justice Blackmun prefaced
his opinion with a short history of sentencing in the United States.
Noting that Congress clearly has the power to determine the appro-
priate punishment for crimes, Blackmun wrote that federal
lawmakers had decided years ago to delegate "almost unfettered
[sentencing] discretion" to judges. 44 Furthermore, this delegation
was justified by the then extant theories of rehabilitation and inde-
terminate sentencing. 145 History proved these theories to be erro-
neous; their practical application led to widespread disparity and
uncertainty. 146
C. DELEGATION OF POWER
Seeking to correct these problems, Congress passed the Sen-
tencing.Reform Act of 1984. In this Act, Congress delegated to the
future Sentencing Commission the authority to create sentencing
guidelines as a means to structure judicial discretion. It was this
delegation of power that petitioner Mistretta addressed first in his
multi-issue challenge of the Sentencing Reform Act.' 47 Mistretta as-
serted that Congress had delegated excessive legislative power to
the Commission. 148 The Supreme Court disagreed.
The established rule governing delegation of power issues is
found in the case of J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States,149
wherein Justice Taft wrote: "If Congress shall lay down by legisla-
tive act an intelligible principle to which the person or body author-
ized to [exercise the delegated authority] is directed to conform,
140 In violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(b)(1)(B) (1970).
141 Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 654.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 650.
145 Id. at 650-51. See supra notes 61-71 and accompanying text.
146 See supra notes 72-85 and accompanying text.
147 Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 654.
148 Id.
149 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
1990] 907
ILENE H. NAGEL
such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative
power. '"150 This "intelligible principle" test is met when Congress
clearly delineates the general policy which the public agency is to
apply.15 1
Using the intelligible principle test, the Supreme Court held
that in establishing the Commission, Congress met, and even ex-
ceeded, the required minimum standard. 152 After reviewing the ex-
tensive guidelines and provisions of the Act,' 53 the Supreme Court
concluded that Congress had given sufficient direction to the Com-
mission by legislating "a full hierarchy of punishment-from near
maximum imprisonment, to substantial imprisonment, to some im-
prisonment, to alternatives-and stipulated the most important of-
fense and offender characteristics to place defendants within these
categories." 54
Thus, Congress had clearly met the intelligible principle stan-
dard. In rejecting Mistretta's assertion of excessive delegation of
power, the Court concluded: "We have no doubt that in the hands
of the Commission 'the criteria which Congress has supplied are
wholly adequate for carrying out the general policy and purpose' of
the Act." 155
D. SEPARATION OF POWER
Mistretta's next argument was that the Sentencing Reform Act
violated the separation-of-powers doctrine in three distinct ways: 1)
by placing the Sentencing Commission in the Judicial Branch, 2) by
requiring that federal judges sit on the Commission, and 3) by sub-
jecting these judges to the removal power of the President. 56 In a
clear and methodical manner, the Supreme Court rejected each and
every argument.
The Court noted that the separation-of-powers doctrine is
based on the Madisonian view that a carefully crafted system of
checks and balances is necessary for preventing the aggrandizement
of one branch of government at the expense of the others. 157
Therefore, wrote Blackmun, "we have expressed our vigilance
against two dangers: first, that the Judicial Branch neither be as-
150 Id. at 409.
151 American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946).
152 IVfistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 658.
153 Id. at 655-57; see S. REP. No. 225, supra note 2, at 50-60; see also supra notes 115-35
and accompanying text.
154 Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 657.
155 Id. at 658 (citations omitted).
156 Id. at 658-75.
157 Id. at 659.
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signed nor allowed 'tasks that are more appropriately accomplished
by [other] branches'. . and second, that no provision of law 'imper-
missibly threatens the institutional integrity of the Judicial
Branch.' "158
The Court noted the following, however:
[W]hile our Constitution mandates that "each of the three general
departments of government [must remain] entirely free from the con-
trol or coercive influence, direct or indirect, of either of the others,
. . ." the Framers did not require-and indeed rejected-the notion
that the three branches must be entirely separate and distinct. 159
The Court continued: "Madison recognized that our constitu-
tional system imposes upon the Branches a degree of overlapping
responsibility, a duty of interdependence as well as independence,
the absence of which 'would preclude the establishment of a Nation
capable of governing itself effectively.' "160
Mistretta's first argument, that the Commission was inappropri-
ately placed in the Judicial Branch, prompted the Court to respond
that while the Commission "unquestionably is a peculiar institution
in our Government," separation of power principles are not violated
by mere anomaly or innovation.161 Moreover, while the Constitu-
tion states that the judicial power of the United States is limited to
cases or controversies, significant exceptions to this general rule
have been recognized. 162 Specifically, judicial rulemaking is an area
which has expanded the strict language of Article 111.163 The
Supreme Court has recognized that the power to write rules is nec-
essary and proper "for carrying into execution all the judgments
which the judicial department has the power to pronounce...
For instance, in years past the Supreme Court has rejected chal-
lenges to certain of the Rules of Civil Procedure. 165 By "established
practice" the Court has also approved of the Judicial Conference of
the United States, the Rules Advisory Committees, and the Adminis-
trative Office of the United States Courts: "Because of their close
relation to the central mission of the Judicial Branch, such extrajudi-
cial activities are consonant with the integrity of the Branch and are
158 Id. at 660 (citations omitted).
159 Id. at 659 (citations omitted).
160 Id. (citation omitted).
161 Id. at 661.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 661-62.
164 Id. at 663 (citations omitted).
165 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1
(1941).
1990] 909
ILENE H. NAGEL
not more appropriate for another Branch."' 166
Mindful of this potential response, Mistretta attempted to dis-
tinguish the sentencing guidelines from previously approved judi-
cial rules on the grounds that the guidelines were substantive rather
than procedural. 167 The Court disagreed, noting that although the
Commission's work was "significantly political," the practical conse-
quences of its work did not impermissibly expand the powers of the
judiciary. 168 The Court continued, "In light of this precedent and
practice, we can discern no separation-of-powers impediment to the
placement of the Sentencing Commission within the Judicial
Branch."1 69
The second prong in Mistretta's separation-of-powers argu-
ment was "that Congress' decision to require at least three federal
judges to serve on the Commission .. . undermine[d] the integrity
of the judicial branch."' 170 The Court took issue, noting first that
"[t]he text of the Constitution contains no prohibition against the
service of active federal judges on independent commissions such as
that established by the Act," and second that "[o]ur 200-year tradi-
tion of extra-judicial service is additional evidence that the doctrine
of separation of powers does not prohibit judicial participation in
certain extra-judicial activity."' 171
The principal relevant prohibition is that judges do not simulta-
neously serve in two capacities. Accordingly, the Court noted that
the Constitution "does not forbid judges from wearing two hats; it
merely forbids them from wearing both hats at the same time."' 172
Applying this rule to the Sentencing Reform Act, the Court con-
cluded that 1) the service of judges on the Commission does not
threaten the integrity of the judicial branch; 2) participation of the
Commission does not affect a judge's ability to impartially decide
sentencing issues; 3) the impartiality of the Judicial Branch is like-
wise undiminished by the requirements of the Act; and 4) that the
mixed nature of the Commission does not require judges to share
their judicial power with non-judges. 173
166 Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 663-64.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 665.
169 Id. at 664.
170 Id. at 667.
171 Id. at 667, 669.
172 Id. at 671.
173 Id. at 672-73. The Court explained further:
We are drawn to this conclusion by one paramount consideration: that the Sentenc-
ing Commission is devoted exclusively to the development of rules to rationalize a
process that has been and will continue to be performed exclusively by the Judicial
Branch. In our view, this is an essentially neutral endeavor and one in which judi-
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The third prong of Mistretta's separation-of-powers argument
was that the power of the President to appoint and remove judges
from the Commission "prevents the Judicial Branch from perform-
ing its constitutionally assigned functions."1 74 The Court was not
persuaded that the President's appointment and removal power
over the Commission would influence the Judicial Branch in any ma-
terial way. As Justice Blackmun opined, "We simply cannot imagine
that federal judges will comport their actions to the wishes of the
President for the purpose of receiving an appointment to the Sen-
tencing Commission," and further, there exists "no risk that the
Act's removal provision will prevent the Judicial Branch from per-
forming its constitutionally assigned function of fairly adjudicating
cases and controversies."' 175
Having responded to the arguments advanced on behalf of Mis-
tretta, the Court re-iterated that while the Sentencing Commission
was "an unusual hybrid of structure and authority," it was nonethe-
less constitutional in both structure and effect. 176
E. SCALIA'S DISSENT
Justice Scalia began his dissent by agreeing with the majority
that the Sentencing Reform Act properly articulated standards for
the Sentencing Commission to follow in applying the authority
which Congress had delegated to it. ForJustice Scalia, however, the
Act was unconstitutional because the delegated power was legisla-
tive, rather than judicial or executive. "In the present case," wrote
Scalia, "a pure delegation of legislative power is precisely what we
have before us. It is irrelevant whether the standards are adequate,
because they are not standards related to the exercise of executive
or judicial powers; they are, plainly and simply, standards for fur-
ther legislation."' 177
Essentially, Justice Scalia concurred in the petitioner's argu-
cial participation is peculiarly appropriate. Judicial contribution to the enterprise of
creating rules to limit the discretion of sentencing judges does not enlist the re-
sources or reputation of the Judicial Branch in either the legislative business of de-
termining what conduct should be criminalized or the executive business of
enforcing the law. Rather, judicial participation on the Commission ensures that
judicial experience and expertise will inform the promulgation of rules for the exer-
cise of the Judicial Branch's own business-that of passing sentence on every crimi-
nal defendant. To this end, Congress has provided, not inappropriately, for a
significant judicial voice on the Commission.
Id. at 673.
114 Id.
175 Id. at 674, 675.
176 Id. at 675.
177 Id. at 679 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ment that the Sentencing Guidelines are not comparable to adminis-
trative rules designed to aid in the administration of justice. In his
judgment, the guidelines are "legally binding prescriptions gov-
erning application of governmental power against private individu-
als ... "178 The work product of the Sentencing Commission would
be "heavily laden (or ought to be) with value judgments and policy
assessments."' 179 With few exceptions, such "basic policy decisions
governing society are to be made by the Legislature."' 180
Turning to the separation-of-powers issuesJustice Scalia wrote
that in evaluating whether or not there has been excessive commin-
gling of the branches, one should look to the branch which controls
the newly created agency: "If Congress, the Legislative Branch; if
the President, the Executive Branch; if the courts (or perhaps the
judges), the Judicial Branch."'' The Sentencing Commission,
however, was established as an "independent agency" within the Ju-
dicial Branch. For Justice Scalia, this independent status makes it
difficult to determine which branch of government, if any, has pri-
mary control over the Commission. Thus, concluded Scalia, the
Commission represents "the creation of a new branch altogether, a
sort of junior-varsity Congress."i82
Justice Scalia concluded his dissent by lamenting the recent
drift of separation-of-powers jurisprudence. It is against this back-
drop that Scalia's dissent is best understood, for in his judgment,
the Constitution is a prescribed structure for the framework and
conduct of our government; it is not a generalized prescription to
prevent excessive commingling on a case-by-case basis.18 3 To Jus-
tice Scalia, the fact that the Sentencing Commission might be a de-
sirable and efficient agency does not compensate for its
constitutional flaws: "in the long run the improvisation of a consti-
tutional structure on the basis of currently perceived utility will be
disastrous."18 4
Clearly, the primary constitutional significance of Mistretta is the
Court's continuation of the separation of powers perspective ad-
178 Id. at 676.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 677. Justice Scalia predicted that Congress would find delegations of its
legislative power to be increasingly attractive in the future. Congress will be tempted to
create "expert" bodies to decide "thorny, 'no-win' political issues" in many areas. Id. at
680 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
181 Id. at 681 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
182 Id. at 683 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
183 Id. at 682-83 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
184 Id. at 683 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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vanced in Morrison v. Olson.185 By establishing the constitutionality
of the Sentencing Commission, however, Mistretta also had an imme-
diate impact on the administration of federal criminal justice. After
Mistretta, only the due process issue was left open by the Court, and
the cirucit courts almost uniformly have rejected this challenge.' 86
V. THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION GUIDELINES
While Congress was quite specific in setting forth the duties of
the Commission, it left several policy issues unresolved with regard
to executing the tasks set forth in the agenda. First, a governing ra-
tionale had to be developed and agreed to, including a set of prem-
ises for drafting. Second, agreement had to be reached on whether
the guidelines promulgated would flow from a real offense based
system, a conviction charge system, or some compromise of the two.
Third, the Commission would have to resolve the degree to which
past sentencing practices would influence the precise types and
lengths of sentences prescribed in the ultimate guidelines. Finally,
the Commission would need to find a mechanism for balancing the
goals of uniformity and proportionality such that the reduction of
disparity of one kind did not stimulate an increase of disparity of
another kind.
Clearly, the above list highlights only the key unresolved ques-
tions left to the Commission's discretion. Numerous other policy
questions remained open for debate. 8 7 The manner in which they
were resolved can best be inferred from a reading of the first itera-
tion of guidelines and accompanying commentary.' 8 8
185 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988).
186 Since Mistretta, defendants have challenged the guidelines by arguing that they
effect a violation of the due process clause in that defendants are not given "individual-
ized" sentences. Every circuit court has rejected this challenge. See, e.g., United States v.
Henry, No. 88-3129 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 11, 1990); United States v. Seluk, 873 F.2d 15 (1st
Cir. 1989); United States v. Allen, 873 F.2d 963 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. Pinto,
875 F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1989).
187 More specific questions, for example, included the following: 1) whether an of-
fense involving six victims should be sanctioned six times the amount as the same of-
fense involving one victim; 2) whether prior arrests should count in the criminal history
score; 3) whether drug abuse should be a mitigator or an aggravator; 4) whether the
increment for the monetary loss should be the same for fraud offenses as for tax or
robbery offenses; 5) whether correlational, but not necessarily causal, relations of cer-
tain offender characteristics and likely recidivism should be incorporated into the guide-
lines; and 6) whether home detention should be equated to community or intermittent
confinement. The first resolution of these issues is reflected in the initial guidelines.
These issues are, however, continuously revisited.
188 UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL (June 15, 1988).
For example, to determine the degree to which data estimating past sentences served
were dispositive in the setting of sentencing guidelines, one can compare the past prac-
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A. THE GOVERNING RATIONALE
According to Professor Andrew von Hirsch, a prolific commen-
tator on sentencing issues, the formulation of an explicit rationale is
critical to the development of sentencing guidelines. 8 9 More spe-
cifically, Professor von Hirsch seems convinced that orthodox ad-
herence to a just desert based (or perhaps uilitarian based) theory,
or some articulated hybrid, is essential. While one might concur
with the suggestion that the adoption of an explicit rationale could
be helpful, it is not clear that von Hirsch's definition of what quali-
fies as an explicit rationale is consistent with the statutory mandate
of the Commission, or its perception of the most strategic way to
proceed, given the administrative and institutional demands in the
execution of the defined tasks. The Commission wrestled for more
than a year with the issue of which rationale to adopt, if any, before
deciding that theoretical orthodoxy to a pure or even hybrid model
would not further the debate, but in fact would hinder the progress
of discussion by virtue of its artificially induced constraints.190 This
is not to deny that the resolution of some problems which emerged
might not have benefitted from the ability to use an explicit ration-
ale as the final arbiter. But the problems inherent in a group pro-
cess of writing guidelines for violations of over 1000 federal statutes
have to be worked through on an individual basis, crime category by
crime category: rote, a priori agreements to one theoretical school
or another do not hold up.' 9 1
tice estimates, UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE
INITIAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS (June 18, 1987) [hereinafter
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT], with the UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES
MANUAL (June 15, 1988).
To determine the resolution of the real offense versus conviction charge based sys-
tem issue, one might compare the UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMMISSION, PRELIMI-
NARY DRAFT SENTENCING GUIDELINES (Sept. 1986) [hereinafter DRAFT GUIDELINES] with
the UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL (June 15, 1988).
189 A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 87.
190 To illustrate, a pure just desert model, focusing on the blameworthiness of the
defendant, might mandate that a defendant's drug addiction should mitigate his sen-
tence, insofar as the offense was less a voluntary act. While blameworthiness might be
attractive as a focus in setting sentences for defendants convicted of some crimes, in the
area of crimes related to drugs, crime control goals rather than just deserts seemed to
prevail: there was equal or greater concern for the fact that addicts are more likely to
commit more crimes of violence, with greater frequency, than a concern for the moral
blameworthiness of the defendant. Thus, a blanket emphasis on blameworthiness was
found to inhibit rather than to further the determination of a normative sentencing
policy.
191 For an elaboration of the key administrative and institutional demands upon the
Commission's decision making process, see SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 188; see
also Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest,
17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1988).
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Furthermore, when Congress created the Commission, it did so
in such a way as to nearly insure that theoretical orthodoxy, the kind
of which Professor von Hirsch and others advocate, would not be
the guiding force. 192 In spite of strong urging by Professor von
Hirsch when the sentencing reform legislation was being drafted,
the Senate specifically chose not to articulate a single purpose, such
as just desert, nor to assign priorities to the four purposes ultimately
delimited. Section 3553 (a)(2) of Title 18 sets forth four purposes
of sentencing: 1)to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to pro-
mote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the
offense; 2)to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; 3)to
protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and 4)to
provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational train-
ing, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effec-
tive manner.
As further evidence of its avoidance of theoretical orthodoxy,
the Senate chose not to use the common term "just deserts": sub-
stituted instead were the words "just punishment for the offense."
No substantial leap of faith is required to interpret the congres-
sional decision to substitute the words "punishment for the offense"
for the word "deserts" as a showing that the statutory intent was to
carve out a goal broader in meaning than the traditional just deserts
emphasis on blameworthiness. 193 Furthermore, the Committee Re-
port stated clearly that requiring the judge to consider "just punish-
ment for the offense" meant it should consider justice for the public
as well as justice for the offender. By introducing the goal ofjustice
for the public, Congress was juxtaposing crime control (utilitarian)
concerns with just deserts concerns, further underscoring its intent
to meld multiple purposes, eschewing simultaneously single pur-
pose orthodoxy. With muliple goals in mind, the judge was to con-
sider the public's interest in preventing a recurrence of the offense
192 Theoretical orthodoxy might be appropriate if the United States Sentencing Com-
mission were engaged in an academic exercise. If such were the case, then Professor
von Hirsch's comments might be more appropriate. But the Commission was charged
with creating a practical and workable set of sentencing guidelines based on a very spe-
cific set of instructions from Congress. To try to persuade seven persons from diverse
backgrounds to set normative sentencing policy on the grounds of a single theoretical
paradigm would not be possible. Compromise and theoretical othodoxy do not go hand
in hand.
193 For a more elaborate explanation of the inappropriateness of using a pure just
desert rationale to guide the drafting of sentencing guidelines in accordance with the
terms of the Sentencing Reform Act, see Markham Memorandum, supra note 109. See
also S. REP. 225, supra note 2, at 75 n. 162 (noting and explicitly rejecting Professor von
Hirsch's testimony that "just deserts" should be the sole purpose of sentencing).
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as well as a just sentence for the convicted offender. 194
In sum, a careful reading of the exact statutory language ulti-
mately adopted, together with a review of the legislative history,
makes clear that commitment to a single explicit rationale, as Pro-
fessor von Hirsch has both advocated to support his praise of the
work of the Minnesota Sentencing Commission, 95 and cited as a
basis for his critique of the United States Sentencing Commission,
would be in direct contradiction to the intent of the enabling legisla-
tion. Such a commitment would particularly offend congressional
intent if it were the just deserts rationale, as advocated by Professor
von Hirsch and former Commissioner Paul Robinson. 96 The fun-
damental purpose of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act was
precisely that purpose included in the title-to control crime. Any
attempt to minimize or eliminate the status of crime control as the
central objective would contravene legislative intent. Only an amal-
gam approach, giving due deference to all four purposes as Con-
gress stated them, would be appropriate. After all, Congress had
considered the option of ajust desert based sentencing system, and
expressly decided to proceed otherwise. Section 3553(a)(2) leaves
little room for an alternative inference.
After a full year's debate on this question, including considera-
tion of the issuance of a detailed document of stated theoretical
principles, and the review of several lengthy versions that might
serve this end, it was the considered judgment of the Commission
that no purpose would be furthered by issuing such a detailed
statement. 1
97
194 S. REP. 225, supra note 2, at 75-76; see also Markham Memorandum, supra note 109,
at 8-10.
195 von Hirsch, Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The United States and Canadian Schemes Com-
pared, IV OCCASIONAL PAPERS FROM THE CENTER FOR RESEARCH IN CRIME AND JUSTICE,
N.Y.U. SCHOOL OF LAW 2-3 (1988).
196 See Dissenting View of Commissioner Paul H. Robinson on the Promulgation of
Sentencing Guidelines by the United States Sentencing Commission, 52 Fed. Reg.
18121 (1987) [hereinafter Dissenting View]; DRAFT GUIDELINES, supra note 188.
197 A philosophical problem arose when the Commission attempted to reconcile the
differing perceptions of the purposes of criminal punishment. Most agree that the ulti-
mate aim of our criminal justice system, and of punishment in particular, is to control
crime. Beyond this point, however, the consensus seems to break down, especially re-
garding the issue of the distribution of punishment in specific cases.
Some argue that appropriate punishment should be determined primarily or exclu-
sively on the basis of the principle of "just deserts." Under this principle, punishment
should be scaled to the offender's culpability and the resulting harms. Thus, if a defend-
ant is less blameworthy, he or she should receive less punishment, regardless of the
danger that he or she may pose to the public and the need to deter others from commit-
ting similar crimes. Others argue that punishment should be imposed primarily on the
basis of practical "crime control" considerations. Defendants sentenced under this
scheme should receive the punishment that most effectively lessens the likelihood of
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The above notwithstanding, to state, as some do in their public
critiques of the federal sentencing guidelines, 198 that the Commis-
sion expressly "abjured" the choice of a particular rationale, invites
the assumption of betrayal of a commitment. 199 It should be clear
that the Commission never made a commitment to choose a particu-
lar rationale, because such a commitment would be inconsistent
with the statutory mandate of multiple purposes.
Furthermore, while the Commission rejected theoretical ortho-
doxy, it did not draft its guidelines in the slipshod manner described
by some academics.200 Lest this erroneous depiction of the process
continue in the literature and lore-where drafts by Commissioners
are characterized as having been "jettisoned" only to be replaced by
future crime, either by deterring others or incapacitating the defendant. The relation-
ship that such sentences bear to those prescribed for other crimes committed by other
offenders is of lesser importance.
Adherents of each of these points of view urged the Commission to choose between
them, to accord one primacy over the other. After much reflection, however, the Com-
mission concluded that such a decision would not further the objectives that had been
set for it. The relevant literature is vast, the arguments deep, and each point of view has
its merits. A clear-cut Commission decision in favor of either of these approaches would
have been inconsistent with the Sentencing Reform Act, which refused to accord pri-
macy to any single purpose of sentencing. It also likely would have diminished the
chance that the guidelines would find the widespread acceptance they need for effective
implementation.
Choosing a single or even a predominant approach was unnecessary because the
issue is more symbolic than pragmatic. In practice, the differing philosophies are gener-
ally consistent with the same result. Moreover, few theorists actually advocate either a
pure just deserts or a pure crime-control approach. Crime-control limited by desert,
and desert modified for crime-control considerations, are far more commonly advo-
cated. The Commission saw little practical difference in result between these two hybrid
approaches: the debate is to a large extent academic.
The Commission sought guidelines that would do justice for victims and the public,
as well as offenders. The guidelines embody aspects of both just desert and crime-con-
trol philosophies of sentencing. Sentences imposed may give effect to both considera-
tions. The Commission simply chose not to accord one theory apparent superiority by
preferring one label over another. The Commission's decision is consistent with the
legislation's rejection of a single, doctrinal approach in favor of one that would attempt
to balance all the objectives of sentencing. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2); 28 U.S.C.
§ 991(b)(1); S. REP. No. 225, supra note 2, at 161; SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note
188, at 15-16.
198 von Hirsch, supra note 195, at 3.
199 "Abjure" is defined as to renounce upon oath, to reject solemnly, implying an
abandoning after made under oath. WEBSTER'S, supra note 13.
200 See, e.g., von Hirsch, supra note 195, at 2:
Shortly after the commissioners were appointed, however, problems began to be
apparent. A first draft of the guidelines was written in the spring of 1986 by one of
the commissioners, and then jettisoned. The next two drafts emanated from the
Chairman's office, were circulated for public comment, and then abandoned after
an unfavorable response. It was only in the winter of 1987 that other commission-
ers were drawn actively into the process. The final draft was written at a late date in
some haste to meet the submission deadline.
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a draft from another single Commissioner, with full participation by
all Commissioners and staff coming only at the eleventh hour-this
Article provides a more fact based account.
The Commission began with an agreement to draft two sets of
theoretically orthodox guidelines: one adhering to the principles of
just deserts, and one to the principles of crime control. A target
date ofJune, 1986 was set for the presentation of both; at that time,
the Commission would extrapolate the best from each, and merge
the two drafts into an approach consistent with the statutory man-
date for a multipurpose amalgam.
Those drafting the just deserts model made a policy decision
that no empirical data were required, despite the strongly held views
of some Commissioners that public opinion surveys assessing rela-
tive seriousness of offenses were crucial to the derivation of a just
desert model. Those advocating the consideration of public rank-
ings of offense seriousness worried that rankings by a lone Commis-
sioner and his staff might not adequately reflect societal views. An
examination of data based on the expressed opinions of large num-
bers of persons, drawn from all ranks of society, would, it was ar-
gued, present important information, and such data could serve as a
test of the validity of the blameworthiness rankings central to the
just desert draft. The alleged rationale for ignoring such data was
that the Commission had been empowered to make these decisions,
not the public. Moreover, relative rankings were the primary focus;
absolute decisions about prison or non-prison, and if prison, for
how long, were less important. The decided absence of the need for
empirical data, coupled with the drafters' willingness to assume
1)that their views of which offense/offender patterns were more or
less deserving of punishment, 2)that the relative ordering of of-
fenses was primary, and 3)that the translation into actual types and
lengths of sentences could arbitrarily be decided at some later point,
enabled the drafters of the just desert model to distribute a draft in
April, 1986. This April distribution was two months earlier than the
agreed upon June target date for the two presentations to the full
Commission and staff.
In contrast, the drafters of the crime control based model were
reliant upon data regarding detection of offenses, recidivism rates,
past sentencing practices, deterrence, and the like. Their efforts to
produce theoretically orthodox guidelines were hampered by the in-
ability to have the requisite data immediately available, and by the
inescapable recognition that the principles of crime control, how-
ever well developed, did not easily translate into empirically verifia-
ble specifications of what type and length of sentence would be most
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effective for violations of over 1000 criminal statutes. Since the
drafters in this group were neither willing to make up sentence
lengths arbitrarily nor to assume that the translation into real types
(prison or non-prison)-and lengths of sentences could follow at a
later point, the effort was stymied.
With only one draft then in hand-the just desert based
model-the Commission proceeded in April, 1986 to distribute the
just desert draft for public comment and internal testing.20' Simul-
taneously, internal Commission efforts were made to juxtapose
principles of crime control on the desert based draft. For a variety of
reasons, that four month effort from April to July, 1986 was an abys-
mal failure. Whether this was because the two models were incom-
patible when forced to confront practical dictates, or because the
process of merging itself was faulty is unclear. What is clear is that
the effort to reach theoretical consensus failed.
At the same time, the four months of intensive testing and eval-
uation made it increasingly clear that the just desert based draft was
neither acceptable to the full Commission, the affected groups-
judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys-nor to the experts and lay
persons in the community asked to assess its viability. Illustrative of
the general response to the just desert model draft were the views
expressed by the distinguished judicial expert, Judge Jon New-
man,20 2 when he summarized the draft as follows:
I believe that the proposal will likely fail to survive a Congressional
veto and, even if allowed to become effective, will lead to a generation
of needless litigation, a series of invalidated sentences, opportunities
for manipulation by prosecutors and defense counsel, and a source of
such confusion among judges as to make likely a clamor for return to
the old system. 203
Judge Newman, among others, took issue with the fundamental
201 UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, IN-HOUSE DRAFr GUIDELINES (Apr.
1986) (available on file at the Commission) (revised and redistributed for comment in
July 1986); UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, IN-HOUSE DRAFr GUIDELINES (July
1986) (available on file at the Commission). The July draft, like its April predecessor,
was a just desert based model.
202 Letter fromJudgeJon Newman tojudge William Wilkins (Sept. 3, 1986) [hereinaf-
ter Newman].
203 Judge Newman went on to advance a number of important objections to the draft:
My first point challenges a basic assumption that underlies the entire propo-
sal-the idea that every increment of harm that can possibly be measured should be
reflected in an increment of additional punishment. I seriously doubt that there is
moral validity to this idea....
... The proposed system requires a precise determination of every factual as-
pect of the criminal conduct because every factual aspect plays a part in determining
the precise numerical score to be used ultimately in determining sanction units.
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thesis of the just desert draft20 4 that every increment of harm could
be measured and should aggravate the sentence, that every factor
that possibly might be relevant should be specified and quantified,
and that the first guidelines promulgated should simultaneously
overhaul federal sentencing and plea practices, while superimposing
criminal code reform and the Model Penal Code on the extant sys-
tem. After four months of internal testing and internal comment,
there was near unanimity in the decision to reject the just desert
based draft.20 5
To state, then, that the first just desert-based draft was 'jet-
tisoned ' ' 20 6 is to miss the critical point. In spite of the legislative
history rejecting an instruction to the Commission to accord pri-
macy to a just deserts model, a full, internal and external four
month review of such a potential model was tested, considered, and
then rejected. Moreover, it was rejected not in any casual or cavalier
manner, but on the basis of a fundamental disagreement with its
premises and assumptions, its impracticability, and its incompatibil-
ity with administrative and procedural requirements of
sentencing. 20 7
This insistence on complete ascertainment of facts can have serious and unfortunate
consequences....
The complexity of the proposed system will create enormous grounds for
error in application of the guidelines and appeals to challenge the sentence. This is
the inevitable consequence of a system that tries for ultimate precision. If every-
thing matters, then every statement of definition must be interpreted, with inevita-
ble mistake and subsequent legal challenge....
The proposed system is unnecessarily restrictive of thejudges....
I seriously question the use of multipliers to enhance and mitigate punish-
ments ....
... There is an enormous risk that moving all at once to your comprehensive
approach will incur such criticism from Congress and such confusion in the courts
that the entire effort will be wiped out by some emergency act of Congress. The
effort to bring coherence to sentencing will then have been set back for decades. I
urge you to take one significant step forward, and then perfect your ultimate plan,
but not try to do it all at once.
Id.
204 See supra note 201.
205 Id.
206 von Hirsch, supra note 195, at 2.
207 The problem of manageability arises in the context of two competing goals of a
sentencing system: uniformity and proportionality. Uniformity essentially means
treating similar cases alike. Of course, this goal could be achieved simply by giving
every criminal offender the same sentence. It can also be approached by creating
only several relevant sentencing categories, such as "crimes of violence,' "property
crimes," or "drug crimes." In order to acheive uniformity, however, a simple cate-
gory such as "bank robberies" would lump together cases which, in punitive terms,
should be treated differently.
To avoid these obvious inequities, the proportionality goal seeks to approach
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In July, 1986, the Commission proceeded to give greater atten-
tion to the statutory directive to consider past sentencing practice.
This provided a basis for starting anew the debate as to what type
and length (if imprisonment) of sentence would be appropriate for
each offense. Again, contrary to the description by some,208 the new
drafts did not emanate from the Chairman's office, but were in fact
generated by the Commissioners and staff together, including the
Chairman, all of whom had faced squarely the problems inherent in
the now rejected July, 1986 just desert based draft.20 9 In fact, the
draft circulated for public comment in September, 1986210 was first
and foremost an attempt to rid the desert based draft of July, 1986
of its most unacceptable aspects-such as the cumulative rather than
interactive theory of harms, and impractical provisions-such as
elaborate fact hearings for scores of guideline factors-while pre-
serving its basic tenets and format-such as grouping similar crimes
into broad like categories. Not surprisingly, many of the public criti-
cisms of that September draft echoed the same criticisms that were
made of the earlier desert based draft.2 1'
Three months of intensive, full time analysis of the public com-
ment on the September, 1986 draft, as well as lengthy formal and
informal Commission and staff debate followed. This led to publi-
cation of a subsequent draft intended to cure the perceived rigidities
in the September, 1986 draft, especially the perceived drastic cur-
tailment ofjudicial discretion. This subsequent draft was published
in January, 1987.212 Public comment, coupled with staff and Com-
mission testing of the more loosely formulated January draft, sug-
each of the myriad bank robbery scenarios from varying sentencing perspectives.
The more the system recognizes the tendency to treat different cases differently,
however, the less manageable the sentencing system becomes.
Breyer, supra note 191, at 13.
208 See von Hirsch, supra note 195, at 2.
209 See supra note 201.
210 DRAFr GUIDELINES, supra note 188.
211 The comments of the Honorable Marvin Frankel, former United States District
Court Judge, are typical:
I have an initial reaction that is negative, because I find this draft incredibly complex
for an initial cut at a problem of such enormous difficulty as initiating the guidelines
on the road to rational sentencing.
I would have thought that you'd have started from the opposite end of the
telescope, that you'd have started with a very simple document and a very simple set
of guidelines that judges, brand new to this and wholly unaccustomed to it, and
their probation officers as well, would not view with a kind of fright that I think this
preliminary set will engender.
M. Frankel, Remarks at the Hearings before the United States Sentencing Commission,
New York, New York (Oct. 21, 1986) (available on file at the Commission).
212 UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, REVISED DRAFT SENTENCING GUIDELINES
Uan. 1987).
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gested that efforts to rid the proposed draft guidelines of their
earlier rigidity had now resulted in proposed draft guidelines that
did not comply with the level of restrictiveness required by the
statute.213
During this same six month period, estimates of past sentencing
practice (time served) were being refined through the addition of
cases and variables. With the same active participation by Commis-
sioners as had been ongoing throughout all of the various drafting
efforts 214-debating actively proposed guideline structures, the type
and length of sentence, the treatment of multiple counts, the inter-
relationship between offense and offender characteristics, a policy
for plea practices, and the like-six of the seven members of the
Commission agreed to a drafting policy for the guidelines ultimately
to be promulgated to Congress. This agreement represented not a
hastily formulated idea, nor a night-before-they-were-due idea, but
rather the natural culmination of an evolutionary process whereby
three previous drafts of varying structures had been evaluated, as-
sessed, tested, revised, and refined against a backdrop of their com-
patability with the statutorily prescribed goals, the political viability
of the acceptance of this dramatic reform, and the intentionally
manifested divergent views toward normative sentencing of those
appointed to serve on this Commission. 21 5 After a careful review of
existing and rejected state guideline systems, written and oral public
comment, and a full year's experimentation involving the drafting of
three different approaches to federal sentencing guidelines, six
Commissioners forged a coalition and agreed to the following:2 16
1) similar offense categories defined by varying statutes would
be grouped together under a single generic heading, 217 such as
213 See, e.g., Testimony by Associate Attorney General Steven S. Trott, United States
Sentencing Commission Public Hearing (Mar. 11, 1987) (arguing that the January draft
violated the 25% requirement embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 994(b) (1984)).
214 This is in contrast to Professor von Hirsch's claim that "[i]t was only in the winter
of 1987 that other commissioners were drawn actively into the process." von Hirsch,
supra note 195, at 2.
215 The make-up of the United States Sentencing Commission was a microcosm of
society, with representatives of varying political persuasion, an age range of 47 years,
judicial, academic and correctional experience, legal and social science expertise, prose-
cution and defense prone, more or less victim or offender sympathetic, ideologically
independent or committed to one, two, a hybrid or no theoretical perspectives.
216 UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY
STATEMENTS (Apr. 13, 1987).
217 For example, the fraud category in the guidelines encompasses the following stat-
utory provisions: 7 U.S.C. §§ 6, 6(b), 6(c), 6(h), 6(o), 13, 23; 15 U.S.C. §§ 50, 77(e),
77(q), 77(x), 78(d), 78(j), 78(tf), 80(b-6), 1644; 18 U.S.C. §§ 285-291, 659, 1001-1008,
1010-1014, 1016-1022, 1025-1026, 1028-1029, 1341-1344. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
AND POLICY STATEMENTS, supra note 216, at § 2F1.1.
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fraud, robbery, or drugs;
2) the base sentence for each offense would be determined as a
result of a discussion process anchored, but not bound by, an examina-
tion of estimates of the average time served in past years for offend-
ers convicted of that same offense, and the percentage given a non-
incarceration sentence;218
3) for articulated policy reasons, sentences could be raised or
lowered with respect to past practice-for example, sentences for
tax evasion or anti-trust might be raised for deterrence purposes;
4) base sentences would be modified by a set of specific offense
characteristics219 as determined by one of the following standards:
a) empirical analyses of past sentencing practice showed that
judges routinely distinguished one offender convicted of the base
offense from another on the basis of such a characteristic-for ex-
ample, the amount of, or type of drugs in drug offenses, the amount
of monetary loss in a fraud, the degree of planning in a fraud, the
degree of physical injury in a robbery, or the possession of a firearm
in a burglary; or
b) the relevant statute makes such a distinction-for example,
the use of a weapon in a bank robbery, trafficking in controlled sub-
stances involving an individual fourteen years of age or less, or dis-
tributing specific controlled substances within 1000 feet of a
schoolyard; or
c) some special compelling reason was articulated to justify in-
cluding the specific offense characteristic-for example, a specific
offense characteristic was included in an analogous or comparable
offense category (to illustrate, assume the degree of planning had
been included for fraud; it would therefore be included for theft
since frauds and thefts often involve similar conduct);
5) conspiracies and attempts would generally be treated the
same as the object offense, with only a modest downward
218 See GUIDELINES, supra note 114, at 1.3-1.4.
219 For example, the fraud guideline allows for an increase of one to I 1 levels depend-
ing on the amount of the loss (a one level increase for a loss greater than $2,000 and an
11 level increase for a loss over $5,000,000, with intermediate gradations). In addition,
if the offense involved 1) more than minimal planning; 2) a scheme to defraud more
than one victim; 3) a misrepresentation that the defendant was acting on behalf of a
charitable, educational, religious or political organization, or a government agency; or
4) a violation of any judicial or administrative order, injunction, decree or process, the
offense level is increased by two levels (or to level 10 if the result is less than level 10).
Finally, if the offense involved the use of foreign bank accounts or transactions to con-
ceal the true nature or extent of the fraudulent conduct, and the offense level as deter-
mined above is less than level 12, the offense level is increased to level 12. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS, supra note 216, at § 2F1.1(b).
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adjustment;220
6) all offense levels for all crime categories would be subject to
enhancement if the court found that the offense involved a vulnera-
ble victim, an official victim, or restraint of a victim; 2 2'
7) all offense levels for all crime categories would be subject to
an upward or downward adjustment, depending upon the court's
judgment as to the offender's role in the offense; 222
8) the total offense level would be eligible for a downward ad-
justment if the court judged the offender to have demonstrated ac-
ceptance of responsibility for the offense; defendants who plead guilty
would not per se be entitled to this adjustment, nor would defend-
ants adjudicated by trial absolutely be precluded from receiving
it;223
9) an offender's criminal history score would dramatically affect
an offender's ultimate sentence; the more severe the past sentencing
record, the more the past sentencing record would exacerbate the
sentence for the instant offense; 224 and
10) for non-violent or otherwise non-serious offenses, the court
would retain the discretion to impose a non-incarcerative sentence,
or in the more serious of these cases, for a sentence that substitutes
community or intermittent confinement for some or all of the pre-
scribed guideline incarceration time.
Agreement to these ten premises, coupled with a commitment
to write guidelines in an iterative process over a period of six years,
formed the core of the rationale that governed the Commission's
drafting policy. It was further agreed that consistent with the legis-
lative history of patently rejecting amendments proposed to format
sentencing guidelines as a tool to manage prison capacity (as was,
for example, done in the early Minnesota guidelines), the Commis-
sion would consider the impact of its guidelines on prison capacity,
but it would not determine what would be an appropriate sentence
on this basis. 225 Moreover, it would neither subscribe nor agree to
220 Id. at § 2X1.1.
221 Id. at §§ 3AI.1-3A1.3.
222 Id. at §§ 3BI1-3B1.4.
223 Id. at § 3EI.I.
224 See id. at 5.2 (Sentencing Table).
225 In its discussion of 28 U.S.C. § 994(g) (Supp. V 1983-1988), the Senate Report
states:
The purpose of [requiring the Commission to take into account the nature and ca-
pacity of the penal, correctional, and other facilities and services available] is to
assure the most appropriate use of the facilities and services to carry out the pur-
poses of sentencing, and to assure that the available capacity of the facilities and
services is kept in mind when the guidelines are promulgated. It is not intended, how-
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an a priori assumption, as advocated by many just deserts propo-
nents, that less rather than more punishment is an appropriate over-
arching goal.226 Finally, it was agreed that the primary goal would
be to issue sentencing guidelines that would provide justice for the
victim, society, and the defendant.
While the above premises and principles formed the governing
rationale, there remained unresolved several key related issues. An
elaboration of some of these issues is provided to reveal the manner
in which the Commission decided how to structure discretion in its
first guideline iteration.
B. REAL OFFENSE CONDUCT VERSUS THE OFFENSE OF CONVICTION AS
THE BASIS FOR SENTENCING GUIDELINES
A fundamental decision that shapes both the form and content
of any sentencing guideline system is the decision whether to base
guidelines on the alleged real conduct, similar to sentencing deci-
sions pre-guidelines (based for example on the conduct charged in
the indictment, or in the government's version, or in the pre-sen-
tence report as prepared by the probation officer), or to base the
guideline sentence exclusively on the offense(s) for which the of-
fender was convicted.
The Commission began with a real offense system in the just
desert based model first considered in July, 1986.227 The Septem-
ber, 1986 draft called attention to the relative advantages and disad-
vantages of a real offense versus offense of conviction based system,
noting that in that draft, the Commission was experimenting with a
modified real offense system.228
ever, to limit the Sentencing Commission in recommending guidelines that it believes will best
serve the purposes of sentencing.
S. REP. No. 225, supra note 2, at 175 (emphasis added); see also id. at 424 (discussing
consideration and rejection, by vote of 15-1, of Mathias amendment to direct the Com-
mission to ensure that the guidelines would not be likely to result in an increase in
aggregate terms of imprisonment, or in the Federal prison population).
226 See A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 79, at 136.
227 See supra note 201.
228 DRAFT GUIDELINES, supra note 188, at 11-15 (The September draft includes an ex-
tensive discussion of the relative merits of real offense and charge offense sentencing
systems.).
The drafters noted that the present federal sentencing system is a real offense sys-
tem. The principal merit of this approach is that it allows a judge to differentiate be-
tween seemingly alike offenders whose offense behavior is actually quite different but
who are nonetheless convicted under the same statute. The drawbacks of such a system
relate to both fairness and administrative concerns. The defendant is convicted on the
elements of the charged offense, not on the other elements of real conduct that the
sentence takes into account. This appearance of injustice is amplified in the context of a
negotiated plea if the judge considers factors the defendant thought mooted by the plea.
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Ultimately, the Commission elected to draft guidelines that be-
gin with the charge(s) for which the offender has been convicted.
Both the guideline category to be used and the base offense level
are tied to the conviction charge(s). However, the base offense level
is then modified by elements of the real offense behavior, consistent
with the adjustments for specific offense characteristics, the victim
adjustments, and the adjustments for the offender's role in the of-
fense. Moreover, the rules adopted to govern guideline application
when there are multiple counts of indictment and conviction, espe-
cially when there is a plea to less than the full indictment, also pro-
vide for consideration of real offense conduct. 229
To illustrate, an individual indicted for ten counts of fraud,
each of which alleges $5500 of monetary loss, but who pleads guilty
to only one count involving $5500, is subject to a sentence that is
bounded by the maximum permitted for the one count of fraud.
The ultimate guideline sentence range, however, includes enhance-
ments to the base offense for fraud involving $55,000, thereby in-
cluding consideration of the total monetary loss reflected in the real
offense. 230 Moreover, when the judge selects the actual point in the
guideline range (usually encompassing a twelve and one-half per-
cent spread from the minimum to the maximum of the range), he or
she is invited to consider any aspect of the offender's real offense
conduct.
With respect to the administrative problems precipitated by a real offense system, the
drafters suggested that such a system would require significant additional resources, it
might handicap the negotiation process, and make it difficult to decide what additional
conduct should be considered.
The drafters suggest that a conviction charge offense system offers defendants max-
imum procedural protection and the ability to forecast their approximate sentence expo-
sure. However, vague statutory language hinders such a system. In addition, it is
unavoidable to take into account some real, uncharged elements. Finally, the drafters
pointed out that a conviction charge offense system inherently transfers sentencing dis-
cretion from judges to prosecutors.
The difference between a real offense system and a conviction charge system is best
explained with an example. Consider two separate defendants convicted of bank rob-
bery. The first bank robber carried a knife while committing the offense, told the teller
he had a gun, and simulated a gun with his finger in his pocket. In addition, this bank
robber had maps of the bank, planned to come at a time that the bank had a maximum
amount of cash on hand, and used a getaway driver. Finally, the first bank robber wore a
ski mask, made all the bank customers lie on the floor, and made off with $20,000.
By contrast, the second bank robber simply enters a bank, hands the teller a note,
and walks away with $300.
Under a real offense system, the judge takes into account all the alleged factors in
the first case. The problem is that there is no standard of proof to guide the judge, and
the weight the judge gives to each factor is unknown. Under a conviction charge system,
of course, both bank robbers would receive exactly the same sentence.
229 GUIDELINES, supra note 114, at 3.11-3.21.
230 Id. at § 2FI.1.
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In the end, the choice to prefer one system over another repre-
sents some compromise. It remains to be seen whether the Com-
mission has compromised at the right point.
C. THE RELEVANCE OF PAST SENTENCING PRACTICE
The Sentencing Reform Act directs the Commission to con-
sider past sentencing decisions, 23 1 albeit with the substantial, ex-
pressed qualification that recognition be given to the fact that many
past sentences have not adequately reflected the seriousness of the
offense. 2 32 The statute leaves little doubt that the intent of the con-
gressional directive to ascertain the average sentences imposed and
served in the past was never meant to bind the Commission to these
averages; rather, it was that they serve as a "starting point in [the]
development of the initial sets of guidelines for particular categories
of cases." 2 33
The issue for the Commission was not whether to consider past
practice, but rather, the degree to which it should be dispositive.
This issue remains today at the core of many Commission debates
on proposed amendments and guideline modifications.
The strongest argument presented for setting guidelines in ac-
cordance with estimates of the average sentence served in the past
was that it would meet simultaneously the need to consider the ex-
tant capacity of penal, correctional, and other facilities.2 34 Further-
more, it was argued by some that binding the new guidelines to the
average time served under past practice would reduce disparity
while maintaining respect for past judicial decisions; the reform in
sentencing created by the new guidelines would be less dramatic,
the change less drastic, and acceptance by judges, prosecutors, and
the defense bar more likely. Finally, for those who feared a whole-
sale increase in sentence severity by the newly appointed Commis-
sion, the link with past practice would serve as a protection against
such an outcome.
The arguments advanced against developing guidelines inextri-
cably linked to past practice were equally compelling. First, it would
contravene the statutory intent by failing to address the fact that "in
many cases, current sentences do not accurately reflect the serious-
ness of the offense. '23 5 Taking the average time served in the past
would provide no remedy for those cases in which past sentences
231 28 U.S.C. § 994(m); S. REP. No. 225, supra note 2, at 177-78.
232 S. REP. No. 225, supra note 2, at 177.
233 28 U.S.C. § 994(m); see also S. REP. 225, supra note 2, at 177-78.
234 28 U.S.C. § 994(g).
235 28 U.S.C. § 994(m).
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were deemed inappropriately lenient given the seriousness of the
harm.
Second, it would undermine the whole thrust of the intended
reform. The Sentencing Reform Act was passed, at least in part, to
make patently clear the rejection of the rehabilitative model and
goals upon which past sentencing decisions had been made, in favor
of the new bases for sentencing-to punish, to promote respect for
law, to deter, and to incapacitate. The abolition of parole2 36 was a
central feature of this reform. 237 To the extent that past sentencing
practices were directed toward rehabilitation, and not towards the
newly articulated purposes of punishment, deterrence and incapaci-
tation, the use of past practice to govern the new guidelines would
be illogical: past sentences were not directed towards the proper
goals, and could therefore not be expected to serve the same ends.
Third, there is no reason to believe that Congress would create,
the President take a year to screen, and the Senate hold hearings to
confirm, a full time, bipartisan, seven member Commission, to serve
for six years, if the expectation was merely that the Commission
would write guidelines rotely mimicking past practice. 238
Fourth, the statute gave specific and elaborate direction to the
Commission as to how to treat career offenders, 239 when to specify a
substantial term of imprisonment,240 when to specify a sentence
other than imprisonment,241 when to impose incremental penal-
ties24 2 and which factors it should consider, among others, in mak-
236 See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 2, at 56-58 (rejecting arguments for retention of
Parole Commission).
237 In the Federal system today, criminal sentencing is based largely on an outmoded
rehabilitation model. Thejudge is supposed to set the maximum term of imprisonment
and the Parole Commission is to determine when to release the prisoner because he or
she is "rehabilitated." Yet almost everyone involved in the criminal justice system now
doubts that rehabilitation can be induced reliably in a prison setting, and it is now quite
certain that no one can really detect whether or when a prisoner is rehabilitated. S. REP.
No. 225, supra note 2, at 38.
238 If the intent of Congress was to mandate guidelines merely mimicking the average
of past sentences served, then a research organization could easily have provided these
averages to Congress; Congress could then have promulgated these averages as binding
guidelines with rather little thought or effort. Given the six year, full time, full resource
commitment, and the elaborate procedures for creating and setting up this Commission,
it strains one's credulity to believe that guidelines merely mirroring past practice would
be consistent with congressional intent. Logic, coupled with the language of the statute,
make patently clear this could not have been what Congress envisioned. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 994.
239 28 U.S.C. § 994(h).
240 28 U.S.C. § 994(i).
241 28 U.S.C. § 994(j),(k).
242 28 U.S.C. § 994(l)(1).
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ing these decisions. 243 If the Commission chose merely to copy past
practice and then re-name the product "the new guidelines," it
would have been forced to ignore these directives and flout the stat-
utory mandate.
Fifth, to tie guidelines precisely to averages of past sentences
served would be to ignore the statutory command to the Commis-
sion to consider "the community view of the gravity of the of-
fense" 2 44 and "the public concern generated by the offense." 245 At
the very least this dictate alone would seem to require that ample
consideration be given to public perceptions of crime seriousness
and appropriate sentences. Given the general public view that
sentences meted out and served in the past were excessively lenient,
and particularly so for certain categories of offenses, 246 a decision to
base the newly promulgated guideline sentences solely on past prac-
tice would flatly disregard the statutory directive to give due con-
cern to public perceptions.247
Finally, while past sentencing practice reflects a kind of wisdom
and judgment, the average of this practice, as an aggregate measure,
grossly obscures the varying purposes for which those sentences
were meted out, the reason why some offenders convicted of the
same offense were given sentences above or below the average, the
impact of a plea agreement, the degree to which judges were re-
sponding to political pressure or to their own internal judgment
about what the sentence should be, public opinion, or perceived
problems of prison capacity. Furthermore, estimates of the average
time served are limited by the fact that they are only that-esti-
mates; perfectly reliable and valid measures of time actually served,
and the way in which judges in the past differentiated one offender
convicted of the same offense from another, are simply not avail-
able. Thus, only very limited weight should be given to extant data
estimating the average of past sentencing practices. 248
243 28 U.S.C. § 994(c),(d).
244 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(4).
245 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(5).
246 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE STATITIcS-1985 148-225 (T. Flanagan & E. McGar-
rell eds. 1986); see also S. REP. No. 225, supra note 2, at 91-92, 177-78.
247 To illustrate, if the public consistently registers in opinion surveys its view that
sentences meted out for white collar crimes fail to adequately reflect the seriousness of
the crime, then promulgating guidelines that merely mimic the average sentence served
by persons in the past stands in direct contradiction to the statutory dictate to consider
public opinion. Indeed, a 1985 survey indicated that 65% of Americans viewed the pun-
ishment given to white collar criminals as too lenient. SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE
STATISTICS, supra note 246, at 162.
248 The difficulty in treating estimates of the average of time served in the past as if
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In sum, to marry sentencing guidelines to past practice would
be to undermine the whole purpose of having a Sentencing Com-
mission that devotes its full resources and time to the thoughtful,
complex problem of drafting sentencing guidelines.
In the sixteen plus months spent drafting,249 the Commission
repeatedly heard all sides of this debate. In the end a decision was
made to use estimates of past time served as an anchor for Commis-
sion discussions about what should be the base offense sentence,
with the expressed understanding that these estimates need not be
dispositive, or permanent, and that the base offense would be modi-
fied by specific offense adjustments and general adjustments based
these averages were valid indicators of past sentencing practices is that the reliability
and validity of the estimated averages is terribly imperfect. This is so because of sam-
pling problems, measurement problems, data analytic and modelling problems, and
conceptual problems. To elaborate, there is no data set available, for federal offenders,
specifying the time actually served. Moreover, if you take a time frame sample of 1985
cases, many offenders will not have served their time when you seek in 1987 to estimate
the average time served: persons sentenced to serve 12 years will still be serving time.
Thus, for a great many offenders in your 1985 sample, you can only assume that they
will be released at their first parole eligibility date; yet, we know this assumption is inva-
lid.
If you take instead a time frame sample from 1980, while more offenders will have
finished serving their sentences, your purpose in looking to past practice will now be
compromised. The putative reason to examine past practice is to ascertain for each
crime category a kind of judicial sentencing norm. A norm established in 1980, how-
ever, before the dramatic change in drugs and drug related crimes as well as white collar
offenses like insider trading, is an outmoded norm-more a historical pattern than a
measure of judicial practice.
These problems are further exacerbated by the small number of cases for each
crime category, and the inability of the statistical models to differentiate adequately be-
tween cases adjudicated by trial versus a negotiated plea. Moreover, conceptually, one
has to decide somewhat arbitrarily, how to define past time served-for example,
whether it includes time added for misbehavior while in prison, or time served after the
denial of parole despite parole eligibility. Furthermore, one needs to determine
whether the measurement of time served should be based on total sentence exposure as
a result of conviction charges, exposure for the most serious charge for which the de-
fendant was convicted, some measure of the defendant's real offense behavior, or some
other factor.
In the words of the Chairman of the Commission's Research Advisory Committee:
[I]t almost never makes sense to think about any statistical result as a single
number; rather, one should think about a band or range of results .... Any single
number used to capture that distribution will necessarily throw out a lot of informa-
tion and give the impression of far more precision than really exists.
To summarize, the Commission will be guilty of misusing . . . results if the
"typical" sentences produced by his models are taken literally as accurately charac-
terizing the past. His results provide a picture of the past in very broad brush
strokes; they should be used to stimulate thought and discussion and could be very
useful if put to those ends.
Letter of Richard Berk (Jan. 14, 1987) (available on file at the Commission).
249 The Commissioners took office in October, 1985. On April 13, 1987, the sentenc-
ing guidelines were transmitted to Congress.
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on real offense judgments and the offender's record of past criminal
history.
The major projected departures from the estimates of past sen-
tencing practice in the first iteration of federal sentencing guidelines
involve dramatically higher sentences for career offenders; 250 the
statute mandates that their sentences be at or near the maximums
prescribed by law. 25 ' The first iteration of guidelines also project,
consistent with a statutory mandate, somewhat higher sentences for
those who support themselves through criminal means. 252
Sentences higher than past practice estimates are also prescribed for
those convicted of violent and drug offenses, partly in response to
new mandatory minimums for drug offenses and the career offender
provision. 253 For those convicted of economic crimes, the shift in
the first set of guidelines was meant to move from an historical pat-
tern of predominately non-incarcerative sentences to more certain
imprisonment, albeit not generally for long terms nor necessarily or
wholly in traditional prison facilities. 254
These changes evidence the fact that despite the use of past
practice data to anchor the Commission's debates on normative sen-
tencing guidelines, these data were by no means dispositive, nor is
there a perfect correlation between the past practice data reviewed
and guideline ranges promulgated in the first iteration. 255 While
some members of the Commission clearly would have preferred that
250 For the purposes of the Sentencing Reform Act, a career offender is a defendant
(18 years old or older) convicted of a felony that is either a crime of violence or a con-
trolled substance offense, who has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime
of violence or a controlled substance offense. See 18 U.S.C. 994(h) (Supp. V 1983-
1988).
251 18 U.S.C. § 994(h).
252 18 U.S.C. § 994(i)(2).
253 See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1982); 28 U.S.C. § 994(h).
254 Internal Commission data provided by the Research Director in October, 1987,
projected, for example, that for persons convicted of fraud, the percent of non-impris-
onment sentences would drop from 59% to 24%. For those convicted of tax violations,
the percent of non-imprisonment sentences is projected to drop from 57% to 3%.
However, the projections for the prison time that will be served, relative to the estimates
of time served in the past, are far less dramatic. For fraud offenses, the projected change
in time served will be from an average of 7 months to an average of 8 months. For tax
offenses, the projected change in time served will be from an average of 5.5 months to
an average of 11.9 months. Internal Commission Data (Oct. 1987) (available on file at
the Commission).
255 Contrary to the views of former Commissioner Robinson, past practice was not
used as an exclusive tool in drafting the guidelines. New and more rational sentences
were set in a number of areas where past practice was judged by a majority of the Com-
mission as having been disparate, discriminatory, too lenient, or otherwise unjust. See
Dissenting View, supra note 196; see also Preliminary Observations of the Commission on
Commissioner Robinson's Dissent, 52 Fed. Reg. 18133, 18137 (May 1, 1987) [hereinaf-
ter Preliminary Observations].
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estimates of past sentencing practice play a lesser role in setting the
first guidelines, and others that it play a greater role, a balance was
struck and agreed to for the first wave of guidelines promulgated.
By reaching this compromise, it was hoped that the public's concern
for increased severity for violence, drugs, recidivists, and economic
offenses would be heeded, that a reasonable justification could be
cited as the basis for the derivation of the type and lengths of
sentences specified, 256 that demands on prison capacity had been
considered, and that the reform would not, in its first iteration, be
revolutionary. Some discernable link to how things had been done
in the past would be present; past judicial logic and wisdom would
be given appropriate credence. It was understood, however, that in
the six years of full time effort Congress alotted for the Commission
to review, refine, evaluate, and modify the guidelines, this issue
would be revisited and reconsidered along with the introduction
and reconsideration of other sources of data and reviews of new
congressional action for specific offenses. 257
VI. DISPARITY COMES IN VARIED FORMS: UNIFORMITY VERSUS
PROPORTIONALITY
A central purpose for the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act
was to reduce unwarranted disparity among defendants with similar
records convicted of similar criminal conduct, and to increase uni-
formity, certainty, and fairness. 258 At the same time, one stated pur-
pose was to set sentences that constitute just punishment for the
offense. 259 Thus, the Sentencing Reform Act envisioned guidelines
sensitive to concerns for both uniformity and proportionality. At-
tempts to maximize one goal may sometimes compromise the other.
256 One of the criticisms of the July, 1986, just deserts draft was that there was no
justification for the numbers. It was the Commission's judgment that it is easier to gain
credibility and acceptance of reform if there exists a reference point for the numbers
generated.
257 For example, the Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690,
102 Stat. 4181 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. ch. 13 (1988)), created several new
offenses (possession of firearms in a federal facility, 28 U.S.C. § 6215), and also raised
the penalties for many other offenses (possession of crack, 28 U.S.C. § 6371; use of a
weapon during a drug transaction, 28 U.S.C. § 6460). The Commission was also in-
structed to expand the use of home detention, 28 U.S.C. § 7305. The Commission must
amend its guidelines in response to each of the changes that Congress mandates.
Other sources of data the Commission might consider during the six year period of
revision and refinement might include contemporary public opinion data on crime seri-
ousness and appropriate sentences, criminal career data, recidivism data, deterrence
data, evaluative data on alternatives to incarceration, and other similar data.
258 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (Supp. V 1983-1988) (effective Oct. 12, 1984). See generally S.
REP. No. 225, supra note 2, at 37-190.
259 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (1988) (effective Dec. 7, 1987).
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The term disparity, in the sentencing context, is generally used
to refer to a pattern of unlike sentences for like offenders. 260 A re-
view of the studies cited to buttress the claim of disparity in the leg-
islative history and elsewhere is consistent with this conclusion.261
The traditional response to this problem is to group offenders into
like categories according to the offense for which they were con-
victed and their criminal history, and to prescribe like sentences for
these allegedly like groups. The statutory dictate-that if the sen-
tence included a term of imprisonment, the maximum of the guide-
line range shall not exceed the minimum by more than twenty-five
percent262-- defined for the Commission the tolerable level of dis-
parity acceptable to Congress. Thus, the chosen mode to structure
discretion and to reduce disparity was to enact sentencing guide-
lines with ranges of no more than twenty-five percent for offenders
classified as having similar records convicted of similar criminal
conduct.
The Commission complied with this directive in several ways.
First, like offenses are grouped together into generic categories,
such as fraud.263 Second, for the first time in the twentieth century,
all offenders convicted of the same criminal offense category will be-
gin with the identical base offense sentence, regardless of the judge
before whom they appear or the jurisdiction in which they are pros-
ecuted. Third, to refine the definition of "similar," whenever the
specific offense characteristics for an offense category are found
present the base offense is modified in precisely the same manner;
for example, defendants convicted of robbery who discharge a fire-
arm during the crime will have their base offense of level twenty
increased by five levels. 2 64 Fourth, the same general modifiers,
when found present, will alter the base offense in precisely the same
manner: for example, if the defendant was an organizer or leader of
a criminal activity, the base offense will be increased by four
260 See supra note 3.
261 See, e.g., 2 RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM (A. Blumstein, J.
Cohen, S. Martin & M. Tonry eds. 1983); Nagel & Hagan, supra note 82; Wheeler, Weis-
burd & Bode, Sentencing the White-Collar Offender: Rhetoric and Reality, 47 AM. Soc. REv.
641 (1982).
262 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) (Supp. V 1983-1988) ("If a sentence specified by the guide-
lines includes a term of imprisonment, the maximum of the range established for such a
term shall not exceed the minimum of that range by more than the greater of 25 percent
or 6 months, except that, if the minimum term of the range is 30 years or more, the
maximum may be life imprisonment.").
263 GUIDELINES, supra note 114, at 2.71-2.74.
264 Id. at § 2B3.1(b)(2). The range for level 18 is 27 to 33 months (assuming no prior
criminal history). An increase of five levels (level 23) yields a range of 46 to 57 months.
Id. at 5.2 (Sentencing Table).
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levels.265 Fifth, the same rules for multiple counts apply to all
cases.2 66 Sixth, the offender's criminal history will be derived on the
basis of a set of consistent, clearly prescribed rules: for example,
three points will be added for every prior sentence of imprisonment
exceeding thirteen months. 267 Prior arrests will not be counted in
deriving a defendant's criminal history score.268 Seventh, the of-
fender's ultimate guideline sentence range will be determined by
the place on a grid where the offense level and criminal history cate-
gory meet; no range for those two points exceeds twenty-five per-
cent. Finally, the option to substitute non-incarcerative sentences
or not wholly incarcerative sentences for imprisonment will be the
same for every judge in every jurisdiction in accordance with the
prescribed guidelines.269
What then, one might ask, remains as a potential source of dis-
parity? The answer lies in the fact that while one kind of disparity is
likely reduced by the adopted system, yet another kind may be intro-
duced. Three sources of this second strand of disparity remain po-
tentially problematic: overreaching uniformity, prosecutorial
discretion, and excessive judicial "departures" from the guidelines.
A central concern and responsibility for the Commission during
these next years of full time attention to revision and modification
will be to assess the degree to which these potential sources of dis-
parity are real, and if so, how best to revise the guidelines so as not
to allow them to undercut the intended effects of the reform.
A. OVERREACHING UNIFORMITY
First, while every effort was made to treat like offenders alike,
less attention was given in the first set of guidelines, partly because
of time constraints, to the possibility of over or under-defining like
offenders. That is, the emphasis was more on making sentences
alike, and less on insuring the likeness of those grouped together
for similar treatment. The problem was exacerbated by the need to
create a manageable and workable system. 270 An illustration should
clarify the dilemma.
One could easily accomplish uniformity by sentencing all of-
fenders convicted of bank robbery to the same sentence. However,
265 Id. at § 3B 1.1 (a).
266 Id. at 3.11-3.21.
267 Id. at § 4A1.l(a).
268 Id. at § 4A1.2(a)(1). But see id. at § 4AI.3(e) (prior similar adult criminal conduct
not resulting in a criminal conviction may warrant upward departure).
269 Id. at 5.10-5.13.
270 See Newman, supra note 202.
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some bank robbers may have used a gun, a knife, a club, or a simu-
lated weapon; some may have taken hostages who they restrained
and beat, others may have taken hostages without violence, while
still others may not have taken any hostages; some robberies may
have involved the use of masks, getaway cars, maps, or lookouts,
while others may have been committed by lone offenders in a rather
spontaneous, unplanned manner; some robbers may have taken
$10,000, some $50,000, and some $5,000,000. The need to create a
workable system left us to prefer fewer rather than more distinc-
tions.271 Thus, a set of standards were adopted 272 to differentiate
one offender from another when both were convicted of the same
offense.273 However, those distinctions not ultimately included in
the guidelines-for example, whether the defendant robbed other
banks during the recent period-could create a source of disparity if
the failure to recognize them resulted in unlike offenders receiving
like sentences. It is this strand of disparity that lies at the heart of
the dissent, 274 for proportionality could be compromised by over-
reaching uniformity.275
B. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
Yet a second and much more likely potential source for this al-
ternative strand of disparity may result from the Commission's deci-
sion to begin guideline calculations with the offense(s) for which the
defendant was convicted. So long as eighty-five to ninety percent of
all defendants plead guilty, and some substantial portion, albeit not
all, couple that plea of guilt with negotiations for charge reductions
or fact bargains or negotiated agreements not to apply the guideline
adjustments as prescribed, then those grouped together on the basis
of the offense for which they were convicted may not in fact be simi-
lar at all. Again, to the extent that they are not similar, unlike of-
fenders will receive like sentences; uniformity will clash with
proportionality and disparity will re-emerge. 276 The fact that the
271 Since every distinction could lead to a dispute, a system which allowed for an end-
less number of aggravators and mitigators would create a nightmarish sentencing hear-
ing potentially longer than the actual trial. Moreover, because the preponderance
standard is in effect, there is little to constrain the judge. See id.
272 See GUIDELINES, supra note 114.
273 SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS, supra note 216.
274 Dissenting View, supra note 196.
275 See Preliminary Observations, supra note 255 at 18133; Supplemental Statement
of Commissioners Ilene H. Nagel and Michael K. Block, in Preliminary Observations,
supra note 255, at 18135; Supplemental Statement of Commissioner George E. MacKin-
non, in Preliminary Observations, supra note 255, at 18137.
276 This was not an unforeseen problem. The Senate Judiciary Committee received
testimony from Professor Stephen Schulhofer, who expressed concern that prosecutors
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control of prosecutorial discretion lies within the Executive Branch,
and the Commission is designated in the Judicial Branch, makes at-
tempts to contain this problem delicate and complex.277
In the pre-Mistretta period, qualitative interview and observa-
tional data collected by the author and Professor Stephen
Schulhofer from a non-random sample of four jurisdictions, sug-
gested that circumvention of the guidelines through the plea negoti-
ating process was occurring in a minority of cases. 278 Four
particular patterns were noted: 1) date bargaining; 2) fact bargain-
ing; 3) guideline factor bargaining; and 4) charge bargaining. In the
first, the prosecutor agrees to drop counts falling after the requisite
date for a guideline sentence so as to be able to negotiate a non-
guideline affected plea. This is likely to be an ephemeral problem,
relevant only to protracted white collar cases over the long run. 279
Fact bargaining, though specifically prohibited in the guide-
lines,280 was observed as occurring in some drug and fraud cases;
can circumvent the guidelines through their discretion to offer plea bargains. S. REP.
No. 225, supra note 2, at 66. To combat this problem, the guidelines prohibit "fact
bargaining." GUIDELINES, supra note 114, at § 6BI.4. More generally, the Commission
addressed the problem of plea agreements in the following manner:
Nearly ninety percent of all federal criminal cases involve guilty pleas, and
many of these cases involve some form of plea agreement. Some commentators on
early Commission guideline drafts have urged the Commission not to attempt any
major reforms of the agreement process, on the grounds that any set of guidelines
that threatens to radically change present practice also threatens to make the fed-
eral system unmanageable. Others, starting with the same facts, have argued that
guidelines which fail to control and limit plea agreements would leave untouched a
"loophole" large enough to undo the good that sentencing guidelines may bring.
Still other commentators make both sets of arguments.
Id. at 1.7. The Commission decided not to make significant changes in current plea
agreement practices in the initial iteration of the guidelines. However, the Commission
undertook to study federal plea practice and consider further regulation of the process
where appropriate. The Commission also noted in the introduction, its expectation that
the guidelines would have a positive effect on plea practice because of the predictibility
of sentence exposure and the norm created for judges in applying Rule 1 (e). Id. at 1.7-
1.8.
277 The Sentencing Commission cannot dictate to a United States Attorney what
counts to charge, since that is exclusively an executive decision. For example, if a fed-
eral prosecutor chooses to circumvent the guidelines by charging a defendant arrested
for distributing 500 grams of cocaine with a phone count (21 U.S.C. § 843(b) (1982))-
resulting in less than one-fifth the sentence exposure-there is little the Commission can
do about it.
278 Schulhofer & Nagel, Aegotiated Pleas Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Prelimi-
nary Exploration of the First Fifteen Months (1989) (unpublished manuscript).
279 More than other offenses, some white collar offenses tend to incorporate a series
of transactions over a prolonged period of time. Therefore they are more likely to strad-
dle the November 1, 1987, guideline implementation date. Of course, eventually there
will be no cases involving pre-November, 1987 conduct and date bargaining will no
longer be an issue.
280 GUIDELINES, supra note 114, at 6.5-6.8.
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the amount of drugs specified or the amount of loss in the fraud
becomes an element of plea negotiations.28 1
Guideline factor bargaining, pre-Mistretta,282 is said to occur
when the government attorney agrees not to include specific offense
characteristics, or perhaps other aggravating adjustments, in his or
her guideline calculation. This is so despite the government's ad-
mission that were they to proceed to trial, evidence to support a
factual finding of those same specific offense characteristics or ad-
justments would be presented. The "more than minimal planning"
adjustment for fraud offenses, the upward adjustments for a defend-
ant's "role in the offense," the adjustment for a "weapon" in a drug
case, are examples of the kind of guideline factors which we ob-
served were treated as negotiable in a minority of plea agreements.
Finally, charge bargaining to circumvent the guidelines was ob-
served in some cases during this pre-Mistretta period. For example,
in one case reviewed by the author and Professor Schulhofer, a drug
distribution count which carried a mandatory minimum sentence of
five years2 8 3 was bargained down to a telephone count2 84 which car-
ried a guideline sentence of six to twelve months.2 85
In March, 1989, partly in response to the suggestion that such
circumvention, if and when it occurs, serves to undercut the key pur-
poses of the guidelines-to reduce disparity, increase certainty, and
in some cases, severity-Attorney General Thornburgh issued a
strong directive to all government attorneys to comport their plea
practices so as to support the full implementation of the sentencing
guidelines.2 86 The combination of the issuance of this memo, the
resolution of Mistretta, the strong support of the United States At-
torneys and the Sentencing Guidelines Subcommittee of the Attor-
ney General's Advisory Committee,2 87 and the extensive training
281 For example, in one drug case involving six kilograms of cocaine, the prosecutor
agreed to stipulate that the transaction involved only six pounds of cocaine. While the
defendants insisted that they intended only to deal six pounds, the Assistant U.S. Attor-
ney admitted that if the case had gone to trial, she would have had no problem establish-
ing the six kilogram quantity.
In a stock fraud case, the prosecution agreed to stipulate to a loss of $60,000 while
admitting that if the case had gone to trial, the loss of $300,000 would likely have been
proven.
282 See supra note 137.
283 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1983-1988).
284 21 U.S.C. § 843.
285 The Pre-Sentence Investigation Reports received at the Commission are confiden-
tial; thus, the name of this case will not be cited.
286 Memorandum from Attorney General Thornburgh to all Federal Prosecutors
(Mar. 13, 1989).
287 The Honorable Joe Brown, U.S. Attorney for the Middle District of Tennessee,
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spearheaded by Professor Stephen Saltzburg, 288 will most likely re-
sult in a pattern of full implementation from federal prosecutors. If
this turns out not to be the case, then the Commission may wish to
re-examine the guidelines to determine where revisions are
necessary.
Extensive monitoring efforts to evaluate the impact of the
guidelines on changes in charging and plea practices are ongoing.
The author and Professor Schulhofer are in the middle of a post-
Mistretta ten jurisdiction study. Complementary to, and independ-
ent of, this qualitative study is the Commission's Research Staff as-
sessment of the same issue. The results of these research efforts
should soon make clear whether substantial revision in the guide-
lines is necessary to ensure the flexibility intentionally left in the
plea process, without re-introducing the disparity the guidelines
were meant to curtail.
C. EXCESSIVE JUDICIAL DEPARTURES
Finally, the Sentencing Reform Act, despite its vast efforts to
structure and constrain judicial discretion, nonetheless provided for
judges to depart when they found "that an aggravating or mitigating
circumstance exists that was not adequately taken into consideration
by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines and
that should result in a sentence different from that described." 28 9
While the initial formulation of the departure standard was two-
tiered and fairly stringent, extreme political pressure-both by
those adverse to the more punitive guideline sentences-and by
those judges who for a variety of reasons wanted a return to greater
flexibility-was exerted to weaken.and loosen the standard so as to
make departures more accessible. 290 The relevance of this to the
serves as Chairman of this committee and is extremely active in promoting complete and
proper use of the guidelines by federal prosecutors.
288 Professor Saltzburg was formerly the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the
Criminal Division. In that capacity, he directed the Department of Justice guideline
training and continues partly to do so in his capacity as the Attorney General's desig-
nated ex-officio member of the Commission.
289 18 U.S.C. 3553(b) (1988).
290 The original standard for departure from the guidelines was the following:
The court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range, referred to in
[the guidelines] unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating
circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by
the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a
sentence different from that described.
Id. This standard was amended in 1987 by permitting departure where "an aggravating
or mitigating circumstance exists that was not adequately" considered by the Commis-
sion. Sentencing Reform Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-182, § 3, 101 Stat. 1266 (1987).
This 1987 amendment was drafted by House members and agreed to by the Senate
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disparity issue is that to the extent that the departure, provision is
abused, disparity-of either or both strands-may reappear; in this
manifestation, both uniformity and proportionality would be com-
promised. As with the potential disparity introduced by
prosecutorial discretion, the potential disparity introduced by exces-
sive judicial "departures" from the guidelines will closely be moni-
tored. Revisions will be made to correct intolerable levels 6f
inappropriate departures.
The Commission viewed the potential evils of trying to reduce
prosecutorial and judicial discretion versus leaving maximum flexi-
bility as two endpoints of a continuum, trying to strike a balance in
its first iteration; only the empirical evidence from the Commission's
monitoring efforts as to how the guidelines promulgated are ulti-
mately implemented and the degree of disparity will tell whether the
right balance has been struck, or whether corrective action is
required.
VII. CONCLUSION
In April, 1987, the United States Sentencing Commission deliv-
ered to Congress a proposed set of sentencing guidelines.29 ' In ac-
cordance with 28 U.S.C. § 994(q),292 Congress had six months to
review these guidelines. Absent a bill to reject their implementa-
tion, the guidelines would automatically become law.
No bills to reject the guidelines were introduced either in the
Senate or in the House. The House Judiciary Committee did, how-
ever, sponsor a bill to delay their implementation.29 3 The vote in
in a compromise which was necessary to avoid a delay in guideline implementation. In
their reluctance and acceptance of this new language, several Senators made clear that
the new provision merely clarified the standard for departure, and "it [did] not broaden
the departure standard in any way." S. 1822, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC.
S16,646-48 (1987) (statements by Senators Biden, Thurmond, Kennedy, and Hatch).
As Senator Hatch noted:
If the (departure) standard is relaxed, there is a danger that trial judges will be able
to depart from the guidelines too freely, and such unwarranted departures would
undermine the core function of the guidelines and the underlying statute, which is
to reduce disparity in sentencing and restore fairness and predictability to the sen-
tencing process.
Id. at S16,647.
A recent memorandum sent by a parole officer to a district court judge which ad-
vises thejudge to use this new language "of a kind or to a degree" to justify a departure
in every possible case demonstrates the continued resistance by some to any system of
structured sentencing. (available on file at the Commission.)
An abuse of the departure provision will only result in a continuation of the unwar-
ranted disparity which existed prior to the Sentencing Guidelines.
291 SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS, supra note 216.
292 28 U.S.C. § 994(q) (Supp. V 1983-1988).
293 H.R. 3307, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987).
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favor of delay was 183; the vote against delay was 23 1.294 The Sen-
ate held hearings on the guidelines on October 22, 1987. With the
strong support of Senators Kennedy, Thurmond, Biden, Hatch, and
others, and the absence of any bill to reject, the guidelines became
effective on November 1, 1987.
Critical essays were published shortly before, and subsequent
to, the November 1, 1987 enactment of the first set of new federal
guidelines. 295 Some fault the Commission for carving out a path of
its own as opposed to following in the footsteps of Minnesota,
Washington, or Pennsylvania-state guideline systems that pre-
ceded the federal scheme. 296 Such comparisons of the state and
federal guideline's fail to recognize that the contexts in which the
respective guidelines were written differ dramatically. Minnesota
and Washington, for example, dealt with 100-150 statutes,297 almost
one-tenth the number of violations included in the federal guide-
lines. Furthermore, state convictions include only a smattering of
white collar and major drug offenses, in contrast to the enormous
heterogeneity of the federal offender population. Federal statutes
are often more complex, as for example RICO, 2 9 8 CCE, 29 9 or the
national defense offenses of treason, sabotage, and the like.300 State
legislatures may be more inclined to commit to a single purpose,
such as to limit additional demands on prison capacity; as stated ear-
lier, the enabling legislation for the Commission evidenced no such
single mindedness or consensus about a single purpose. 30 1 Thus,
294 133 CONG. REC. H8215 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1987).
295 Robinson, A Sentencing System for the 21st Century?, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1987); von
Hirsch, supra note 195.
296 See, e.g., von Hirsch, supra note 195, at 2.
297 The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines apply to 148 statutory crimes. MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 244 app. (West Supp. 1989) (statutory index). The Washington Sentencing
Guidelines apply to 103 different statutory crimes. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.320
(1989).
298 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988) (effective Oct. 15, 1970).
299 21 U.S.C. § 848 (Supp. V 1983-1988).
300 Statutory provisions listed in GUIDELINES, supra note 114, at 2.117-2.126.
301 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (1988) (effective Dec. 7, 1987) (listing four purposes of
punishment). The Sentencing Reform Act lists a series of instructions to the Commis-
sion. Though not necessarily contradictory, there is a clear tension among some of the
statutory directives. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 994(m) (Supp. V 1983-1988) (Commission is
to ascertain past practice but is not bound by it); 28 U.S.C. § 994(d),(e) (Commission is
to consider relevance of employment, family ties, and other factors in establishing cate-
gories of defendants, but the guidelines shall reflect the general inappropriateness of
considering such factors in setting a prison sentence); 28 U.S.C. § 994(d)(11) (Commis-
sion is to consider the "degree of dependence upon criminal activity for a livelihood" in
establishing categories of defendants); 28 U.S.C. § 994(i)(2) (guidelines are to be
socioeconomically neutral, but are to punish severely criminal conduct from which de-
fendant derived "a substantial portion of his income").
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just as the Sentencing Reform Act represented a compromise that
took nearly ten years to pass, so the first iteration of federal guide-
lines promulgated reflect that same mix of values.
Some criticisms compare the federal guidelines to an idealized
view,30 2 without regard to the difference between academic preci-
sion or theoretical orthodoxy and the real world of reform in which
such guidelines have to be reviewed, accepted, and implemented.303
Those of us who come from the academic world are used to appeal-
ing to logic, reason, theory, empirical data, law, precedent, and
principle as ways ofjustifying the positions we take and arguing for
their adoption. But in the final analysis, we operate independently;
consensus is unnecessary. Those who come from the trial courts
similarly are used to the same appeals; as well, they enjoy the power
of position to ensure acceptance of their views. But an independent,
multi-member federal commission cannot operate successfully bor-
rowing only or even mainly from these traditions. A majority must
agree, Congress must approve, and the constituent groups affected
must not revolt; otherwise the reform, however brilliant its concep-
tion, will ultimately fail. The Sentencing Reform Act and the estab-
lishment and appointment of a federal commission were political
acts; the evolution of the guidelines promulgated in that context can
only be measured by the standard of the politically possible. It is
this reality that prompts some to proclaim the quest for perfection
the enemy of the good.
The Commission publicly proclaimed its initial guidelines as
302 See Robinson, supra note 295.
303 In a letter to Judge Wilkins dated July 23, 1986, (available on file with author),
Anthony Partridge, Research Director of the FederalJudicial Center, critiqued the initial
"just deserts" draft of the guidelines prepared by and advocated to the Commission by
Commissioner Paul Robinson. Although praising the draft as "a brilliant and imagina-
tive effort to rationalize the allocation of criminal punishments," Partridge noted:
Unlike geometry, the mathematical model used here does not begin with axi-
oms and proceed to its conclusions through deductive logic. There is no axiom that
states that a harm caused negligently should carry three-tenths as much punishment
as the same harm caused intentionally. There is no axiom that says that punish-
ments for offenses involving different amounts of property should be proportionate
to the fourth root of the value of the property. Nor can these propositions be de-
rived from axiomatic statements. They are valid, it seems to me, only to the extent
that they reflect policies whose basic justification lies outside the mathematical sys-
tem. To put it another way, the correctness of the answers produced by the mathe-
matical model depends on whether those answers are socially acceptable. There
will be no point, as there is in geometry, at which you can say that the answer is
correct because it is the answer produced by the mathematical manipulations called
for by the draft.
And he concluded by stating:
In summary, while I have a lot of admiration for the quality of the thought that
has gone into the draft guidelines, I think you will ultimately conclude that the
model doesn't work.
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only the first stage in an evolutionary process; guideline drafting is
meant to be dynamic, not static.3 0 4 The Commission is committed
to iterating new guidelines and to changing the existing guidelines
in accordance with the monitoring and evaluative data it collects and
analyzes, and the rethinking and revisitation of its preliminary
decisions .305
The Commission is committed to an extensive ongoing moni-
toring and evaluation process. With the Supreme Court's issuance
of Mistretta, the monitoring effort was set in motion to provide data
about the number of guideline sentences handed down, which
guidelines are being used for which offense behavior, the rate and
stated reasons for departures, the frequency and appropriate use of
guideline adjustments, and more. In addition, a multi-faceted eval-
uation has begun whose purpose it is to provide short, intermediate,
and long range estimates of the impact of the guidelines on changes
in disparity, severity, charging and plea practice, and the relation-
ship between real offense conduct, the offense of conviction, and the
ultimate sentence, as well as how the guidelines are being imple-
mented, the degree to which they are implemented as intended, who
plays what roles, and what processes and procedures are followed in
what sequential order.
On the basis of these and other data, coupled with the contin-
ued review of public comment and advice from all constituent
groups, and the actions of Congress, the Commission is committed,
304 This dynamic process may be analogized to what John Rawls has labeled "reflec-
tive equilibrium." Rawls explained that "considered judgments are no doubt subject to
certain irregularities and distortions despite the fact that they are rendered under
favorable circumstances." J. RAWLS, A THEORY OFJUSTICE 48 (1971). These irregulari-
ties prevent our considered judgments from matching the regulative principles which
govern these judgments. Id. at 48-49. Thus, concludes Rawls, "[T]he best account of a
person's sense ofjustice is not the one which fits his judgments prior to his examining
any conception ofjustice, but rather the one which matches his judgments in reflective
equilibrium." Id. at 48.
As the Commission gathers data from the initial applications of the Guidelines, it
will also reflect upon how its considered judgments are faring under the regulative prin-
ciples of everyday application. Changes will and must be made where appropriate in an
effort to attain a proper equilibrium.
305 In the first iteration, we attempted to proceed in a manner consistent with Profes-
sor Michael Tonry's admonitions:
The sentencing commission will be perched on the edge of an abyss; some of the
abyss's contents are known or foreseeable and others are not. Given the complex-
ity, novelty, and scope of the commission-guidelines idea, the complex political-
ideological-intellectual-bureaucratic-institutional context in which the commission
must operate, the fragility of the guidelines concept in the face of judicial
truculence, and a healthy human skepticism about the abyss, the commission will be
well advised to move in small steps, with caution.
M. Tonry, Sentencing Guidelines and Sentencing Commissions-An Assessment of the Sentencing
Reform Proposition in the Criminal Code Reform Act of 1977 (unpublished manuscript).
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in accordance with its congressional mandate, to devote full time
effort for six years to revise and refine the sentencing guidelines. By
so doing, we hope to comply with the statutory prescription to "re-
flect, to the extent practicable, advancement in knowledge of human
behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process."30 6
30.6 28 U.S.G. § 991(b)(1)(C) (Supp. V 1983-1988) (effective Oct. 12, 1984).
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